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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
In December 2010, Tarek Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor had set himself
on fire to protest against the humiliation he suffered on the hands of a woman police officer.
While the government tried to quell the potential impacts of Bouazizi’s protest, his death served
as a catalyst to the call for political change. Several Middle Eastern and North African countries
– such as Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Algeria and Jordan – have been affected by
the uprisings dubbed as the “Arab Spring”.1
With the occurrence of the 2010 Tunisian revolution, the Egyptian opposition groups
took the opportunity to instigate demonstrations and labor strikes throughout the country to force
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign from office.2 As the protests occurred in Egypt and
in other parts of the Middle East, protesters sought the support of the international community to
facilitate reform and democracy in the country– especially from the European Union (EU).3 With
its closeness to the region and the implications of the Arab uprisings to the European nations, it
is a question as to how the EU contributed to the unleashed political process.

1

Katerina Dalacoura. “The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: political change and geopolitical

implications.” International Affairs 88.1 (2012): 63-66.
2

Central Intelligence Agency. "Egypt." The World Facebook. October 20, 2015.

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html (accessed October 24, 2015).
3

W Vandenhole. Child Soldiers and the EU Policy on Children on Armed Conflict. Brussels: TEPSA,

2014.
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Statement of the Problem
With the onset of the Arab Spring, external actors found themselves caught off guard by
the democratic uprisings and the implications they hold to their respective national interests in
the region. For the EU, the instability in the region presents challenges to the long relationship
the European nations culminated with the Middle East, especially with Egypt. The uprising
created a situation where the EU had to develop new policies to capitalize on the opportunity for
democratic change while maintaining the decades long EU’s interest in Egypt. Accordingly, the
main question this study tries to answer is whether and the extent to which the EU was able to
adopt the proper policies, particularly whether the EU was able to use the resources at its
disposal to facilitate democratic change in Egypt.
The following secondary questions would also be answered throughout the study:
1. What is the nature of the EU’s foreign policy in terms of its mechanism, limitations,
major premises and factors influencing its effectiveness?
2. What is the history of EU-Egyptian partnership prior to the Arab Spring?
3. Where there any changes to EU-Egyptian relations after the Arab Spring to the
present?
4. How does the situation of Tunisia and the EU’s actions in the country differ from the
EU’s actions in the Egyptian case?
Hypothesis
This study will argue that while the European Union has established several channels that
would aid Egypt in reemerging from the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU was not able to
adjust its policies in a way that could have make it more effective to capitalize on Egypt’s
democratic window of opportunity. Consequently, the EU continued to prioritize its tangible
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interests over democratization. The political instability in the region, the interests of EU member
states and the complex nature of the EU’s structure are the reasons for the EU’s failure. The
guiding hypothesis of this thesis are stated as follows:
Hypothesis 1
The existing differences in interest and lack of coordination amongst EU member states
has affected an overall effective EU foreign policy; of which hindered EU institutions from
promoting democracy in Egypt during the Arab Spring.
Hypothesis 2
The development of an effective policy towards Egypt during the Arab Spring did not
take place due to the institutional setting and complex structure of the EU.
Objectives/Significance of the Study
This study aims to investigate if the European Union as an individual power can promote
change in regions affected by the Arab Spring, especially democracy. Like other countries
involved in international issues such as the EU, democracy promotion is a major component of
their foreign policy. However, the EU often acts in support with US efforts when it comes to the
resolution of a conflict and recovery of a certain country. Democracy promotion and reform are
integral elements to the EU’s foreign policy and the researcher hopes to understand if the Union
can indeed deliver its promises. This study is also important because democracy is often
considered by the Western powers as the key to Middle Eastern recovery but what do the people
see over the Western-led programs to achieve this freedom.
Literature Review
In recent years, the Middle East has been a hot topic for the international community as
the political instability in the region has brought immense conflict. The public started rebelling
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against decades old autocratic regimes present in the region, ushering the beginning of the Arab
Spring. However, the regimes they are trying to overthrow have fought extensively against
protesters and paralyzed the entire country in the process. In Egypt, the impact of the Arab
Spring not only triggered political unrest in the country, but also the political uncertainty as the
country remained unstable even after the overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak. The international
community had been involved with the efforts to resuscitate Egypt through the Arab Spring and
the European Union’s actions have been seen by experts both as a beneficial and controversial in
nature. This literature review will look in depth to the analysis of various experts with regards to
the European Union’s involvement with the Arab Spring, especially in the issue of Egypt.
Like the United States, the EU is supportive over the actions of protesters in fighting for
democracy in Egypt. The EU made itself serve as an impartial mediator, sending emissaries
consistently in the region to ensure that negotiations can be brokered in a neutral environment. It
uses diplomatic pressure to ensure governments would agree to the dialogues set by negotiations,
approving funding to ensure targets are met for reform to flourish. 4 Various external policy
objectives or instruments such as political, economic and military means were used by the Union
in various degrees and the Union had also used civilian policing and judicial instruments to
sustain its policies. In terms of its foreign policy, the Union uses diplomacy extensively to ensure
that continuous dialogue between the Union and the developing country is sustained. The EEAS
is an integral actor in utilizing continuous diplomacy between the Union and other nations.
Economic policy instruments are used by the Union in terms of its foreign assistance programs.
Military and civilian instruments are used in several critical events worldwide to ensure that
4

Richard Youngs. From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed. (Brussels: Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2014): 12.
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political and economic policy instruments are usable by the Union to establish relations with
recipient countries. When the Lisbon Treaty was introduced, a clear framework to the EU’s actor
capability was highlighted to ensure policy instruments are used without issues by the member
countries.5
The EU immediately adjusted its policies in the first phase of the Arab Spring; but they
knew that they cannot direct the tide to their intentions. Instead, the EU redirected its position to
mirror the intentions of the Arab protestors. They also believed that sustainable stability must be
restored in Egypt and in the Arab region. The EU’s positions were clearly stated under the
“Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” and later
on, “A New Response to a Changing Neighborhood”, highlighting that the EU would actively
support ongoing democratic transition processes.6 The EU also highlights three priorities when it
comes to supporting democratic transition. The first priority deals with deep democracy, which
would restore human rights freedoms and democracy. The EU also pledges to build people
partnerships to boost civil society development and ensure they will be involved in the
establishment of the new European Neighborhood Policy between the EU and Egypt. Finally, the
EU also assures that they will aid Egypt’s efforts to promote inclusive growth and sustainable
development to ensure that democracy would run deep and ensure active participation from the

5
6

Bretherton & Vogler.” 385-386.
Ivo Iliev, Gabriela Tabakova, Ivan Nikov, Mariela Koycheva, Krasimir Yankov, and Ralitza Trifonova.

European neighborhood policy- a new attitude towards the "Southern neighbors". (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
2012): 10-13.
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public. 7 Aside from these two policies, the EU also introduced the “3 Ms” in ensuring that
reform and progress can be sent to the region through the EU’s assistance. These three M’s –
Money, Mobility and Markets – would ensure the recovery of affected Arab countries by the
Arab Spring and ensure the creation of new opportunities for progress to develop in the country.
It is also expected that these three M’s would also open civil society participation and
development to flourish, while helping businesses to get funding.8
In comparison to the policies stressed by the EU, the individual members of the EU had
also expressed their own intentions with regards to their involvement in the Arab Spring. The
positions of these individual member countries influences EU’s overall policies in the region,
mostly highlighting these member country’s national interests and regional priorities in the
region. 9 The United Kingdom, for example, sees Egypt as a key partner for the success of the
Middle East Peace Process alongside Sudan and Iran. Egypt is also seen as a buffer against
extremist in the region and a key commercial partner of Britain. With the onset of the Arab
Spring, Britain had immediately increased dialogue between key Egyptians leaders and
protesters, calling for democratic elections.10 On the other hand, for France, it intended to use the
7

Timo Behr. After the Revolution: The EU and the Arab Transition. Policy Paper No. 54, (Paris: Notre

Europe, 2012): 8-10.
8

European Commission. "The EU's response to the 'Arab Spring'." European Commission Press Release

Database. December 16, 2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-918_en.htm (accessed October 5,
2015).
9

Elena Lazarou, Maria Gianniou, and Gerasimos Tsourapas. "The Limits of Norm Promotion: The EU in

Egypt and Israel/Palestine." Insight Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 179.
10

British Parliament; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. British Foreign Policy and the

'Arab Spring': Second Report of Session 2012-13. (London: The Stationery Office, 2012): 67.
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situation as a means to boost France’s position as the leader of the EU and lead the efforts in
pushing for change in the region. However, France’s realpolitik policies in the region was not
able to hold firmly, especially after Hosni Mubarak – an ally of France - was ousted in 2011. In a
statement after the protests, President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted that he underestimated the
significance of these protests and highlighted the necessity to revising EU policies in the region.
11

During the period of the Arab Spring in Egypt and after the interim governments were
put in place, experts have been divided with regards to the impact brought in by EU involvement
and the extent of EU policies. The EU has regularly sent emissaries and its top leaders like
European Commission President Barroso and European Council President Van Rompuy in Egypt
to support continuous movements for democracy and human rights. The Partnership for
Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP) published on March 8th, 2011 also highlighted the
EU’s initial policy response to the Arab Spring and how democracy and human rights protection
would be attained through the improvement of civil society groups. Although there is a flexible
clause on how the PfDSP would be applied for civil society improvement, its effectiveness is
challenged by the document itself because it did not clearly define who are the ‘social partners’
and ‘civil society’ that should be supported.12 The Morsi government had immediately resumed
talks with the EU with the creation of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement and the
development of the ENP Action Plan. The EEAS had also sent electoral experts to ensure that
11

Barah Mikail. France and the Arab Spring: an opportunistic quest for influence. Working Paper No.

110, (Madrid: Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), 2011): 5.
12

Andrea Teti. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU

Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." Middle East Critique 24, no. 1 (2015): 12-20.
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the Egyptian Elections of 2012 will be in accordance to democratic standards and held fairly
without interruptions. The EU has also offered to send in an EU Election Observation Mission
(EOM) should the Egyptian government seek their assistance. Financially, the EU has opened
449 million euros for 2011-2013. Further financial pledges were also offered by the EIB and
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) amounting to 5 billion euros, the
SPRING Programme meant for socio-economic reform offered 90 million euros and 163 million
euros would be offered by the Neighborhood Investment Facility. The EU has also agreed with
the Egyptian government to to further establish a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement
to ensure economic reform in the country.13
Despite these proposals and aid reliefs, experts believe there is a necessity to review its
current partnerships and programs in Egypt. First, considerations on the political balance in the
country must be considered as President Morsi’s policies are pragmatic, but somehow unstable.14
Although he had been vocal at first in continuing EU-Egyptian relations in order to resuscitate
the country, the Egyptian political environment remained unstable due to Morsi’s declarations
that restricted opposition towards his control.15

13

European Commission. "EU's response to the "Arab Spring": The State-of-Play after Two Years."

European Commission Press Release Database. February 8, 2013. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-1381_en.htm (accessed October 5, 2015).
14

Timo Behr, and Aaretti Siitonen. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement after

the Arab Spring. FIIA Working Paper No. 77, (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013): 15.
15

Ibid.
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Furthermore, the EU remains divided as to how they can unify their foreign policy
towards these ailing countries. 16 There were experts stressing that the EU’s revisions of its
foreign policy were not done in preparation of their actions towards Egypt, but it was done out
of bureaucracy. It is said that that the EU no longer had a clear goal and intent in changing its
Southern neighbors, especially after the failed 2010 elections.17
There is also the issue of Egypt’s continuous economic problems, thus the need for the
EU’s policies to be economic-centered.18 It is also noted by experts that the EU must ensure that
their policies in Egypt are stronger similar to their actions in Tunisia, pressuring the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces to deliver democracy.19 Further assurances must also be done to
ensure that EU incentives are delivered in the region which would catch the attention and support
of the donor countries. The lack of clear protocols and benefits Egypt will gain from EU’s
assistance causes them – and other Arab countries – to turn down any potential negotiations with
the EU regarding EU’s Action Plans.20 Currently, it is notable that while Europe’s assistance in
the region does present opportunities for change and development in the region, it is uncertain as
16

Kristyn Greco. "The Arab Spring: Where Was the EU, and What is its Future Role in the Region?" Jean

Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 13, no. 4 (2013): 5-6.
17

Vera van Hullen. EU Democracy Promotion and the Arab Spring: International Cooperation and

Auhoritarianism. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian, 2015, 134.
18

Vanda Amaro Dias. "A Critical Analysis of the EU's Response to the Arab Spring and its Implications

for EU Security." Perspectives on European Society and Politics, no. 1 (2014): 50.
19

Daniela Huber. "Mixed Signals" Still? The EU's Democracy and Human Rights Policy Since the

Outbreak of the Arab Spring. IAI Working Papers 12, (Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2012): 5-6.
20

Richard Youngs. The EU and the Arab spring: from munificence to geo-strategy. Policy Brief no. 100,

(Madrid: Fudacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2011): 2-4.

13

to whether or not it would strengthen the possibility of agreements to hold. 21 Experts also argue
that should in case these transitioning countries fait to recover, Europe would have to face the
security threats that would be brought by immigration, especially when returning migrants to the
country.22
The ineffective EU policies in Egypt makes a point of agreement among most scholars
and observers. Some evidence suggests that policies were attempted but failed, while others
simply suggest false flags on the part of EU institutions and member states in attempting to
provide any real help. Hollis uses primary evidence or reference points by EU institutions, which
admit to failure in the region.23 She refers to ‘EC High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy’ statements that admit to revisions needed to policies in Egypt. Hollis
also cited inefficiency in the EEAS in keeping up with the changing Egyptian political
environment. Vivien Pertusot added that the failure of the EU institutions was also attributed to
its incapacity to coordinate with its member countries which prolonged their collective action to
the Egyptian crisis. Each institution also varied on how the EU should act towards Egypt. 24

21

Michelle Pace, and Peter Seeberg. The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the

Mediterranean. (London: Routledge, 2013): 121-122.
22

Micheline Ishay. "The spring of Arab nations? Paths toward democratic transition." Philosophy and

Social Criticism, 2013: 9-10.
23

Rosemary Hollis. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'."

International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012): 87-89.
24

Vivien Pertusot. "Tiptoeing Around the Issue: Europe's Response to the Egyptian Uprising." Carnegie

Europe. May 27, 2011. http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=44230 (accessed November 10, 2015).
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This offers an interesting perspective as Pertusot and Hollis’ opinions are drawn from EU
rhetoric, as opposed to a more analytical perspective offered by Behr. 25 His argument suggests
that EU foreign policy failure in Egypt originated from a handful of European states setting EU
foreign policy, as the Union as a whole, was more entrenched in the handling of the global
financial crisis.26 It is unique how both scholars, along with the likes of Rosa Balfour, do agree
that policy was set purely in favor of individual bilateral relations between member states and
Egypt; working to benefit leading EU member states. Balfour; however, does go on to suggest
though that this was a result of the ever growing competition for dominance of resources in the
region between the US and EU member states.27 We must be vigilant in the knowledge that this
level of competition put mutual efforts in place between Europe and the US to secure mutually
beneficial sources; while on the other hand ,creating a form of state-level competition. What is
meant by this is the individual economic competition between the likes of Germany and the US,
as well as Germany and France, to name but a few outside of EU institutions and establishments.
Pierre Vimont argues that the complex institutional setting of the EU framework for
policy making generally hinders the EU ability to develop effective foreign policy. He claims
that EU member states have no framework or criteria for foreign policy-making. Therefore, the
‘added value’ brought by EU foreign policy has never really been felt, but much rather based on
the achievements of individual member states away from EU institutions.28
25

Behr. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its

Spots?" Amsterdam Law Forum (2012).
26
27
28

Ibid.
Balfour. Changes and Continuities in EU-Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring. 31-34.
Pierre Vimont. “The Path to an Upgraded EU Foreign Policy.” (Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 2015).
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Given that EU foreign policy during the Arab Spring was to advance democracy, in much
the same way they preached all over Europe, the tools they disposed upon the Arab region
suggest otherwise by scholars. Rosa Balfour’s perspective is a stance of pragmatism, in that she
isolates humanitarian assistance; military assistance by NATO forces also affiliated within the
EU, as well as economic support, analyze as points for review of the issue; based on these
pragmatic tools actually being carried out after the Arab Spring. 29 Her analysis suggests that
these tools either did not go far enough, to bring any real change to the region; or were in fact
counterproductive and served only to benefit strong states in the EU and their own foreign
policies.30 Case in point being the use of the EU to achieve specific access to resources following
the Arab Spring, by using NATO forces to overthrow General Gaddafi in Libya; despite the
legality of the operation being questionable. This contrasts with the expressions of Jon Marks
who portrays the EMP, since its induction, all the way through the UFM and onwards, as to be
the actual points of analysis to refer to for EU foreign policy tools in the region.31 His argument
portrays these key methods as a way for the EU to tackle the worsening migration problem in
Europe, through a questionable development policy in the Arab region, which covers up true
intentions; serving to only cover areas in the economy, border security, and even constitutionally
to repel migrant movements into Europe.
Hollis, on the other hand, again examines the rhetoric of the EU in exemplifying their
successful exportation of democracy throughout Eastern Europe following the collapse of Soviet
29
30
31

Ibid.
Ibid.
Jon Marks. ‘High hopes and low motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative.’

Mediterranean Politics 1, no. 1 (1996): 1-24.
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Satellite states. 32 Again, she does the job of balancing a positive and negative opinion by
showing that the EU had a more successful record, especially in economic senses, in the Arab
region, if compared with other external actors, such as the Americans or non-European NATO
states. On the other hand, she does hold strong criticism for the credibility of the ENP. All source
analyzed from a critical perspective, express the ENP as nothing more than a means of advancing
EU individual member states own respective policies, rather than achieving the claims they set
out to be of mutual benefit; securing a strong baring for the hypothesis on EU member states
interfering in the ability of EU institutions to do the required job.
Again, Vimont additionally critiques the structure of the EU, in so far that it leads its
decisions and toolbox on the powers originally given to the Union by its treaties and by the
decisions of EU constitutional judges, therefore not allowing EU institutions responsible with
issues of foreign policy to have all capabilities at their disposal.33
This lack of framework for dialogue amongst EU member state is furthered by Timo
Behr34, who acknowledges the existence of tension or the lack of agreement between essentialist
and contigencist interpretations of political Islam from within the EU and among member states,
as a basic example in post revolution relations with the region. As a result of this, Behr argues
that a bi-polar stance exists from within the EU, leading to an effective and ever-changing set of
policies being put in place. Furthermore, he argues that this has led to conflicting policies by

32
33
34

Hollis. "No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the 'Arab Spring'.": 87-89.
Ibid.
Timo Behr. "The European Union's Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard

Change its Spots?" Amsterdam Law Forum 4, no. 2 (2012): 79.
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member states within their bilateral relations.

35

His reference focuses heavily on the

interpretations of Political Islam from within the EU in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
Conceptual Framework
The EU’s foreign policy is influenced by various factors that affects the continuity of its
functions and changes the level of its effectiveness: presence (EU’s international reputation and
expectations to EU’s actions), opportunity (external environment) and capability (internal
factors).36 These three factors make the analytical framework applied in this thesis.
Presence/ International Image
Presence involves the ability of one actor to exert its influence and for the EU, this meant
a combination of the EU’s identity and the impacts of its internal policies. The EU is often
considered as “community of security and prosperity”, allowing it to gain the cooperation of
other nations supporting the ideals of the Union. 37 With the cooperation of other nations, it
increases EU’s presence in the international community and call for further cooperation. The
presence of the EU in the global arena has been sustained by its internal achievements since the
establishment of the customs union and the single market. The growing EU ‘s capabilities serves
as a magnet for the Union to accumulate partners whom wish to gain benefits from the Union’s
resources. 38

35
36

Ibid.
Charlotte Bretherton, and John Vogler. "A global actor past its peak?" International Relations 27, no. 3

(2013): 376.
37
38

Bretherton & Vogler.” A global actor past its peak?” 377
Bretherton & Vogler.” 377-378.
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According to the article of Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, prior to the onset of the
Arab Spring in Egypt and other Arab nations, the EU was considered one of the pioneers of
international human rights protections and democracy promotion after the United States. In light
of this image, the EU had introduced various instruments to sustain its democracy promotion and
human rights programs worldwide through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR-I) program. Under the program, the EU allocates funds meant for the
improvement of human rights and democracy promotion in recipient countries. However, even
before the Arab Spring, several reviews were done by the EU regarding the effectiveness of the
EIDHR-I where problems have been indicated.39
By the time the Arab Spring occurred in Egypt, Andrea Teti stated that the EU still
maintained its stance in protecting human rights and democracy promotion. The Union retained
the conceptual framework which was used under the EIDHR-I, stressing that their action in
Egypt and other Arab nations represents an innovation on how external relations can be done. 40
Opportunity/ external environment
Opportunity, on the other hand, refers to the external environment that influences foreign
action. The external environment could mean the onset of events that opens the possibility for
EU involvement. Globalization and the initial isolationist policies of the administration of
George W. Bush, including the withdrawal of the United States in 2000 from the negotiations
regarding the Kyoto Protocol are some of the instances where the EU stepped as the global
39

“The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries” in

2001 (COM (2001) 252).
40

Andrea Teti. "Democracy without Social Justice: Marginalization of Social and Economic Rights in EU

Democracy Assistance Policy after the Arab Spring." Middle East Critique 24, no. 1 (2015): 12-20.
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leader.41 In the case of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the EU’s foreign policy was challenged by the
domestic politics of Egypt which remained unstable, generating conflicting demands on external
actors, and defied external influence.42
Capability/ Internal factors
Finally, the EU’s foreign policy effectiveness and continuity is also influenced by the
internal factors that redefines the capability of the EU’s foreign policy. Experts often highlight
that the EU’s foreign or external action/inaction is determined by its capability on formulating
policy and utilize various policy instruments to enforce these policies. In terms of policy
formulation, the EU’s policies are often influenced by three factors: coherence between levels of
policy-making, coherence between policy sectors, and institutional coherence between EU
institutions. The impact of these coherence issues vary in severity depending on the policy area
in question with foreign and security policy included in the ‘sensitive’ areas that has greater
importance when it comes to how these three factors affect EU’s external policy. Under the
problem of coherence between levels of policy making, member states’ interests play role in
establishing foreign policy because while these member countries can support EU action, many
would prefer to continue old relations with countries they have long relations such as former
colonies.43 The influence of the member countries differ in nature in the EU’s foreign policy
capability because of six major factors: entry date, size, wealth, state structure, economic
ideology and integration preferences. When it comes to foreign policy, the size, state structure
41
42

Bretherton & Vogler.” 379.
Timo Behr, and Aaretti Siitonen. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches? Civil Society Engagement after

the Arab Spring. FIIA Working Paper No. 77, (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2013): 15.
43

Bretherton & Vogler.” 382-383.
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and attitude towards integration preferences influence how the member countries develop their
policies towards the particular developing countries. 44
Three member countries of the EU also influence the nature of its foreign policy and
redirects the policies to match their respective foreign policies. Germany, France and the United
Kingdom. Although there are other big member states, these three are generally perceived as
global actors due to their permanent membership in UN Security Council (UK and France) and
their position in the global economy. Collectively, the Big Three represent 40% of the EU’s total
population and a half of the EU’s GDP. The three countries also possess the largest share of
military expenditures and provide over 40% of the EU’s diplomats.45
EU foreign policy is also influenced by coherence between policy sectors such as trade,
environment, and energy. With the multi-level nature of the EU, coherence between policy
sectors is often difficult to achieve. Finally, coherence between the EU’ internal policy
coordination through its institutions also play a role in the capacity of EU foreign policy. Several
of the policies and programs which were created by the EU to ensure integration between all
institutions of the Union are fluid in terms of policy coherence such as the Cardiff Process in
1998.46
The factors under policy formation in the case of Egypt can be seen in various parts of
the Crisis. In the case of coherence between policy-making levels, each member country had
44

Brigid Laffan, and Alexander Stubb. "Member States." In The European Union: How does it work?, by

Elizabeth Bomberg, John Peterson and Richard Corbett, 74-98. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 76.
45

Stefan Lehne. The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy. Publication, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2012): 7.
46

Bretherton & Vogler.” 381-385.

21

their respective positions with regards to how the EU should react. The Big Three – Germany,
France and the United Kingdom – for example, defined their own version of EU action on
January 29, 2011 without considering the EU’s overall stance in the issue.47 There was also a
lack of support from the EU member countries when it comes to the enactment of the revisions
for the ENP as some members were against continuous EU-Mediterranean relations while others
pressed their national interests in dealing with the region.

48

Methodology
In order to analyze the arguments properly regarding the EU’s actions in the Egypt
throughout the Arab Spring and its aftermath, this study utilized content analysis and a case
study. Content analysis is one of the major tools used in political science research and the perfect
research method to interpret the documents from the EU and its member countries throughout the
duration of the crisis. This research method will also be able to permit the researcher to verify the
facts. The case study, on the other hand, is also utilized by this researcher to provide a brief
analysis of two different countries and indicate their similarities and differences. For this study, a
case study is used to determine the nature of the EU-Egyptian relations before, during and after
the Arab Spring and highlight the similarities and differences it has over another country which
the EU has been involved with, such as Tunisia. The case study would also provide the
researcher and the researchers an overview with regards to the nature of the entire crisis.
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CHAPTER II: THE NATURE OF EU FOREIGN POLICY
This chapter discusses the nature of EU’s foreign policy and the EU’s intentions of
expanding its international presence. A thorough explanation of the region’s foreign policy
objectives and mechanisms will be included alongside its limitations and restrictions. The EU’s
democracy promotion would also be discussed. The EU’s effectiveness as an international actor
is also discussed, with a brief discussion of its actions in Tunisia throughout the Arab Spring will
also be included to highlight similarities or differences in the EU’s actions in Egypt.
Mechanisms of the EU’s foreign policy
The EU’s foreign policy mechanism is quite complex as it has a multifaceted system that
divides EU’s foreign policy into different levels. This multifaceted system of the EU takes into
consideration two different treaties: The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The TEU includes the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), highlighting the
influence of the member countries in terms of developing the EU’s foreign policy through the
European Council and the Council of Ministers. The TFEU, on the other hand, comprises the
“Community method” wherein the Council of the EU, the Commission, the European Parliament
(EP) and the Court of justice tackles majority voting regarding external policies of the Union.
However, it is observed that the EU does not always adhere to the premises of the
Treaties when it comes to foreign policy, especially depending on the foreign policy issue in
question. The national and the EU level actors play a key role in developing EU’s foreign policy,
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ensuring that the national level remains influential in EU institutions while the EU’s policies are
applied by the member states. Foreign policy is also influenced by the international context
through the organizations and alliances done by either the EU or the member countries. As a
result, all of the Union’s foreign policy is done in conjunction with other organizations and the
organization’s initiatives. The EU foreign policy also showcases the presence of national foreign
policy despite the presence of a common foreign and security policy that would unite the EU’s
member countries on foreign policy. As signatories to the TEU, member states are expected to
adhere to the CFSP. However, with the creation of the Lisbon Treaty’s Declarations 13 and 14,
member countries have the power to influence EU’s foreign policy.49
Goals of the EU foreign policy
The EU’s foreign policy is not always influenced by external objectives which has the
capacity influence the external environment, but it is also influenced by their internal objectives.
The EU’s internal objectives can be classified into three categories: interrelational objectives,
integration objectives and identity objectives. Interrelational objectives often consider the mutual
relations of each member country influenced by the Union’s intentions on integrating its member
states in one group. After the Second World War, European integration was one of the major
concerts of the Union to improve relations between European states and create a medium
wherein countries can achieve their national interests without resorting to war. Considering this
intentions, the EU’s foreign policy is designed to promote diplomacy to prevent conflict between
member countries especially on issues on foreign policy. This framework is also designed to
ensure that mutual understanding between countries can be achieved. However, this also means
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that member countries can opt out from supporting or resolving a specific foreign policy within
the EU framework because it may cause further conflict between member countries.
Aside from interrelational objectives, the EU’s foreign policy also takes into
consideration internal objectives that would boost not just the European integration initiative, but
also influence how Europe can grow as a united region. Member states can adopt foreign policies
that would match this objective, proving to the rest of the world that the EU is a group that
legitimizes their unity and create a collective identity that unites each member country. Of
course, member states’ support in this level may vary depending on the foreign policy issues that
may influence their own national interests. These objectives also showcase that each member
state and its actors have high expectations with the EU’s capacity and show their capacity in
influencing the EU’s foreign policy.
Aside from these objectives, additional objectives are highlighted by the TEU and the
TFEU that supports the EU’s foreign policy. Under the TEU, the international action of the EU is
based on the virtues that has designed its inception. Article 21(2) of the TEU also adds that the
EU aims to ensure that its values, national interest, security concerns, and integrity through its
foreign policy. The EU also aims to prevent conflicts and preserve peace in various regions in
order to strengthen the capacity of international security worldwide. The Union also wishes to
aid the development of sustainable development in developing countries which is currently
having issues on stopping the growth of poverty. They also hope to introduce trade unions and an
active participation of all nations in the world market. The TEU also highlights the intentions of
the EU to boost environmental protection and better aid and humanitarian efforts worldwide.
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Finally, the TEU also highlights that the EU also aims to use its foreign policy to promote a
stronger international system that has active cooperation from all states.50
Limitations and Restrictions of the EU’s foreign policy
However, the foreign policy of the EU has three major limitations that restricts their
actions in the international community. The first limitation the foreign policy has is the issue on
task expansion. As the EU continues to expand, the EU has to consider how to integrate the new
government within its complex framework. Prior to the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU
had more than 40,000 diplomats and took over 1,500 missions. However, while these diplomats
ensured that the EU had a presence in these countries, it was difficult to initiate foreign programs
as no government or minister can issue orders for these diplomats. Further issues were also
caused by the fragmented infrastructure in Brussels where the EU headquarters is located. Upon
the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action
Service (EEAS), the High Representative was given the power to order the EEAS and monitor
the activities of the EU diplomatic corps worldwide.
Aside from the problems in task expansion, another critical limitation in the EU’s foreign
policy is its incapacity in uniting the Community into one cohesive unit when it comes to
political and economic programs and positions. Normally, the European Union has the capacity
to deal with ‘low’ politics or domestic politics that would ensure that issues such as economics,
trade and common monetary policy would be supported by all member countries. In terms of
trade, for example, the Community method of decision-making is used to establish the policy and
provides power to the Union’s infrastructure. The EU also flourished as one of the leaders in aid
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and development policy and environmental diplomacy. However, when it comes to ‘high
politics’ or issues pertaining to traditional diplomacy, the Union is unable to speak as one unit.
Although the members of the EU are signatories to the Maastricht Treaty that introduced the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), there is still no common and singular foreign
policy that would replace national foreign policies completely. It is also difficult for the EU to
launch the CFSP because it needs intergovernmental consensus that would allow the EU to stand
in for the member countries and member country support.
Finally, the EU is also limited and restricted in movement because of the expectations of
the world regarding the capacity of the EU in fulfilling its targets and supporting their actions.
Since the end of the Cold War, EU foreign policy-makers had exaggerated the capacity of the
region’s foreign policy and stressed that the Union can respond to issues faster than other
countries. However, for the past two decades, the EU’s narrative of being an effective global
actor waned to the point they still are not considered as a major global power by the rest of the
globe. In one statement, former EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten stated that
Europe can be considered as a good support to the US when it comes to supporting the resolution
of world issues and they can also be effective when it comes to solving problems close to the
region like the issue in the Balkans 51
Democracy Promotion of the EU
It is also under the EU’s foreign policy initiatives that it also aims to promote democracy
in an international level. According to Article 21(1) of the TEU, the EU’s international stance is
influenced by core objectives and principles that highlight the Union’s values:
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“The Union’s actions on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to
advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and
international law.”52
The EU’s intentions on spreading the growth of democracy holds merits as many experts
have indicated that the region has been the most successful in promoting democracy and human
rights worldwide. Prior to the creation of the EU, Germany had led the region’s initiatives in
promoting democracy through the creation of training and seminar workshops that would
introduce democracy. Political parties in the period even created international offices in order to
support the democracy programs. British political parties also supported democracy development
in the region and the government has provided funding for most of these efforts. When the EU
had been established, it slowly incorporated the ideas by its member countries on how it can
introduce democracy to their newest member countries and accession countries. This was
important considering that the EU had processed the expansion of the Union to former
communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe.
Aside from the premises of the TEU, further efforts by the EU to improve its democracy
promotion in its foreign policy was done through the improvement of its development assistance
programs in 2005. The European Council adopted a resolution that would call new member
states to contribute 0.17 percent of their gross national income to the Union’s development
assistance program by 2010 and later on, contribute 0.33 percent by 2015. Although the
52
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percentage of the contributed funds of the member states were very modest, the active
participation of each member state to the initiative shows that the EU has now grown as a
significant actor in foreign assistance. Many member states had highlighted that these foreign
assistance contributions are for the introduction of democracy and human rights. Democracy and
human rights had also been the prime focus of European Commission President Jose Manuel
Barroso as he even introduced new institutions and programs to ensure that these democracy
assistance funds and services are delivered to nations needing their support. Currently, the EU is
even considered as the world’s largest foreign aid donor.
One of the programs introduced and used by the Commission for democracy assistance is
EuropeAid. Under the program’s main mandate, EuropeAid’s functions are the following:
“The Commission’s support to democratization pursues both a top-down and bottom-up
approach. This includes democratic institution building, such as capacity building of
parliaments and local governments, electoral support and observation, reform and
training of the judiciary, and anti-corruption measures. It also covers civil society
programs, including projects supporting non-state actors in their advocacy, information
and education activities in the areas of human rights and democracy, as well as lobbying
to secure political change or to monitor the actions of public institutions.”
Aside from the EuropeAid, the EU also uses the European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights program as a means to deliver assistance to recipient countries. The program has
an annual budget of 140 million euros that would be used for the improvement of civil society
organizations that would lead in democracy development in the country. The funding also
supports EU’s election monitoring programs around the globe. The EU also uses the funds to
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assist in stopping programs like capital punishment and violence and support organizations like
the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.53
However, some critics indicated that EU’s democracy promotion is quite vague in nation
despite the fact it is considered one of the leaders in democracy promotions worldwide. The
Union remains divided over the creation of a European Consensus on Democracy which would
highlight a unified definition on democracy for the entire Union. Elements on what kind of
democracy the Union also tries to pursue is very vague, even in some of its programs such as the
EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. When the EU
included the Central and Eastern European countries, there were inconsistencies on how the EU
can introduce democracy in these countries now that they are a part of the EU. It is essential that
the EU resolves this issue because it would prevent its effectiveness in promoting democracy.54
EU’s Image in the International Arena
When it comes to the EU’s status in the international community, it has a very varied
relation with the several members of the international community depending on their
specialization and policies. The EU either takes a full membership participation when it comes to
international organization or an observer status, depending on the policies supported by the
organization. For example, the EU is only an observer in the International Labor Organization.
However, if there are instances where the EU is prevented from taking part of international
organizations, the EU retains some semblance of presence through their Member States.
Although some Member States can be reluctant over representing the EU, these member
53
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countries are expected to represent the organization especially if the Union holds immense
influence in an issue domain as part of their cooperation. After the Lisbon Treaty was enforced,
several provisions were listed by the treaty when it comes to the Union’s stance in international
organizations and it is the High Representative who represent the Union in the international
community. 55
EU Foreign Policy in Effect: Tunisia
Like other Mediterranean countries, the EU and Tunisia have shared a very long
relationship that enabled the EU to retain a semblance of presence in the country. Tunisia is a
signatory to the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) which was established
under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and political dialogue began between Tunisia
and the EU in 1998. There were issues when it came to the negotiations with the country due to
the quality and content of the dialogue as noted by the Association Council meetings between the
EU and Tunisia. Tunisia also restricted some movement for the democracy promotion in the
region with the EU because of meeting postponements and political dissonance as seen in 2005
and 2007. The EU was also unable to commit to new programs with Tunisia for democratic
reform since 2005 due to the complications of imposing earlier projects raised under the MEDA
and the EIDHR program. However, there were analysis stressing that EU-Tunisia partnership in
establishing democracy promotion in the country from the 1990s to 2005 had failed because of
little democracy assistance programs in the first place and the limited quality of projects.56
55

Henri de Waele, and Jan-Jaap Kuipers. "The Emerging International Identity of the European Union -

Some Preliminary Observations." In European Union's Emerging International Identity: Views from the Global
Arena, by Henri de Waele and Jan-Jaap Kuipers, 1-20. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013): 7-10.
56

Van Hullen. “EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean.” 14-15.

31

When Tunisia had requested an upgrade with their bilateral relations with the EU after
the Union granted advanced status for Morocco in 2008. The EU had boosted its negotiations
with the country to suggest improvements in Tunisia’s human rights programs. However, the EU
showed contradictions when it comes to its actions because it had delayed negotiations with
Tunisia and the Commission was set in setting a very strict political reform set for the country.
Although the EU did promise in 2009 that they will work on negotiations with Tunisia, the EUTunisia Association Council did not meet in 2009. It was only in 2010 did the EU and Tunisia
negotiating parties meet to discuss the proposals submitted earlier in the year.57 Negotiations
were put on hold when the protests began in December 2010 and the EU had taken until January
10, 2011 to release an official statement regarding the protests. In the EU’s official statement,
they only called for restraint and called for the Tunisian government to release the activists. On
January 14, 2011, the EU welcomed Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s announcement that he will not
take part in the electoral campaigns in 2014 while the public denounced the Ben Ali regime for
the massacre of over 60 demonstrators in the country. The EU also supported the Tunisian
government’s announcement that they will no longer use live rounds against protesters, and the
Union would still continue talks with Tunisia to improve relations to “advanced status” despite
the brutality of the government towards protesters. The Union – through the joint statement of
HR/VP Ashton and Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Commissioner Stefan Fuele – did
stress they will include human rights protections in their discussions with Tunisia. Critics such as
the left-wing, Liberal and Green MEPs had opposed the EU’s delayed actions to the killings,
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favoring on improving EU-Tunis relations first then putting human rights protections second in
the negotiations.58
A positive support from the EU was only stressed when Ben Ali departed Tunisia,
stressing that they will support democracy promotion in the country. Observers also did highlight
that the EU’s actions in Tunisia still needs improvement, and stronger action should be done
considering the delay in EU’s response regarding the issue. According to Emelie Doromzee of
the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, the EU should stop negotiations with Tunisia
and strongly condemn the Tunis action towards the people. In her statement, Doromzee stated
that:
“Until now, the language has been so far from what one would expect and sees
elsewhere. The EU has put out a very weak statement. It is past the stage of written
statements. It is almost a month now that these protests have been going on. We need
concrete actions from the EU.”59
Aside from the subdued reaction of the EU upon the crisis, the EU member countries
presented problems with the EU’s actions to press for reform because some of them supported
the Ali regime. France, for example, supported to Ben Ali by offering to dispatch the riot police
to help Ben Ali’s government to stop the protests. Southern European countries were also against
a strong worded sanctions because of the possible influx of immigrants to their countries if
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sanctions are imposed in Tunisia.60 Euromed and other independent bodies named France, Italy,
Malta, and Spain in support of Doromzee’s analysis and indicated that these four countries
influence EU Council policies on EU action towards Tunisia and other northern autocracies.
Euromed Human Rights Network Coordinator Matthieu Routier stressed, after his visit to
Tunisia and Algeria, that the EU member states should be worried about regards to Tunisia
because unless intervention is done, human rights and further political instability will continue to
worsen in the next coming days.61
Concluding Remarks
The EU’s foreign policy features a very complex mechanism that takes into consideration
its history and the values that had brought to its inception. Every member country has a
contribution to the creation of the EU’s foreign policy and the EU aims to design its actions
based on these member country’s interests. However, given the complex nature of the EU’s
membership and its overall influence, there is an issue when it comes to ensuring that their
foreign policy is effective in the international level. It is clear that EU’s major foreign policy
characteristic points out to the promotion of democracy, which is a very important virtue that
must be introduced to developing nations. In the Tunisian example, EU’s democracy promotion
and reform campaign did not take root that easily due to political stability in the country,
especially the changing attitude of the ruling regime prior to the onset of the Arab Spring. The
EU’s institutions were also divided as to how they would get Tunisia to become involved with
the programs, often forcing the delays to occur. When Tunisia did agree to increase negotiations,
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the EU itself did not immediately meet with the Tunisian side before the onset of the 2010
demonstrations. When the Arab Spring occurred, the EU was unable to bolster the negotiations
which were yet again halted by the protests to the point that they remained subdued and late with
their response to the crisis. Considering the example of Tunisia and the nature of EU’s foreign
policy, it is possible that the EU will show the same type of reaction when it comes to their
involvement in Egypt when the Arab Spring has occurred in the country.
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CHAPTER III: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE ARAB SPRING
This chapter expounds on EU’s relationship with Egypt even before the Arab Spring took
place in 2011. The researcher will be expounding on the several partnership agreements between
the two countries, from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for Mediterranean.
Finally, this chapter would also expound on the extent of EU-Egyptian relations prior to the Arab
Spring, as well as the political conditionality and evaluation of EU-Egyptian relations prior to
2011.

Before the CFSP
Europe has always been considering expanding its presence in the Mediterranean even
before the 1990s. In the 1970s, the European Economic Community (EEC) signed several trade
and cooperation agreements with various countries in the region, including Middle Eastern
nations. The agreements such as agriculture, industry, infrastructure, energy, education, training
and scientific cooperation were just some of the few agreements done by the EU with the
Maghreb countries, Mashreq countries, Israel and Palestine.62 In the case of Egypt, they first
signed an agreement with the EC in 1977 which established EU-Egyptian relations. The
cooperation agreement signed by both parties ensured that Egypt would receive assistance when
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it comes to economic, technical and financial programs to ensure its development, as well as
commercial cooperation to ensure that Egyptian goods are also delivered in the European
Market.
The Cooperation Agreement also enabled the EC to participate in the development of
Egypt’s critical infrastructure which would diversify its economic capacity. This partnership
ensured that Egypt would slowly revolutionize its activities and eventually improved Egyptian
industrialization and modernization. The Egyptians also flourished in the fields of science,
technology and environmental protection. Europeans also brought in new income for Egyptians,
as well as investments to improve the private-public companies in Egypt. Through the EUEgyptian protocols and the Cooperation Agreements signed from 1977 to 1995, Egypt received
the following funds and programs that aided its development: Private Sector Development
Programme (45 million euros), Support to the Population Programme in Upper Egypt (10 million
euros), Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization Programme (43 Million) and the Reform of
the Financial Sector/Central Bank (11.7 million euros).63
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
The first major development that formally established EU-Mediterranean relations and
stronger EU-Egypt relations was the Barcelona Conference in 1995. For the beginning of the
discussions, the EU had begun negotiations with ten Southern and Eastern Mediterranean
countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon,
Turkey and Syria. The negotiations included premises on the establishing relations between the
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two regions. The results of the negotiations were written and adopted the Barcelona Declaration,
which created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The EMP includes three chapters:
“Political and Security Chapter”, “Economic and Financial Chapter” and “Social, Cultural, and
Human Chapter”. The first chapter covers the agreement of both parties when it comes to the
promotion of peace in the region. The following chapter pertains to the slow, but gradual
economic integration and finally, the third chapter addresses the enhancement of cultural and
societal relations.
To achieve the target set by these chapters, the EMP acted on two levels: bilateral and
regional. In the bilateral level, the EU and its Mediterranean partners would ensure that EUMediterranean relations are improved and promoted to the people even at an individual level.
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements highlights the framework as to how each
country can achieve relationship promotion and organize action. In a regional level, the EMP
calls for the establishment of regional dialogue between countries to ensure that they would
cooperate in improving political, economic and cultural ties between EU countries and
Mediterranean countries. Further aiding the implementation of the EMP are organizations such
as the European Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) which serves as a Forum for
both the European Parliamentary and the Mediterranean partner parliaments for issues regarding
intercultural dialogue and prepare for the establishment of a European Mediterranean Assembly.
Other institutions included in the EMP aside from the EMPA also include the EuroMediterranean Summit, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, and the EuroMed Committee.64
64

Ash Suel. From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean. Perceptions

(2008): 94-100.

38

With the application of the EMP, the EU had been in negotiations with Egypt to finalize
the new version of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, which has been in development
throughout 1994. However, the talks were only concluded in June 1999, and the text of the
agreement was only completed in February 2001 because the support financial objectives under
the Barcelona Declaration’s Economic and Financial Chapter were not met such as the free trade
area. The European Parliament approved the entire proposal in November 2001, but it was only
in 2004 when the Agreement have been placed into action because of the negotiations regarding
its bilateral provisions. 65 As the new Association Agreement was development, the MEDA
program had been in action to provide bilateral aid to signatories of the EMP. The actions under
the program aim to fulfill the objectives of the three sectors of the EMP66:
-

Reinforcing political stability and democracy;

-

Creating a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area and the development of economic
and social cooperation;

-

Taking due account of the human and cultural dimensions.

The MEDA funds provided to partner countries do not have a fixed percentage allotted to
each member; however, the amount these partners receive is dependent on their effort and
progress. The regulation of the MEDA also considers two important details: first, MEDA
partners do not need to be a country that allows decentralized support to its hierarchy, and it
requires a high degree of active and equal participation on the site. Second, political
65
66

European Institute for Research. (n.d.). EU-Egypt Relations
Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany

(MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership
[Official Journal L 189 of 30.07.1996].

39

conditionality is included in the MEDA funds. Recipients of the MEDA program do not have to
pay back the funds they receive from the EU. However, the EU does have the power to stop
MEDA funds if the recipient country has violated the premises of the EMP. A second version of
the MEDA was later on introduced in 2000 to be implemented until 2006 and had a better
framework when it came to financial distribution. MEDA II had an overall budget of 5.350
billion euros from 2000 to 2006, and it was more capable than MEDA I as 90% of the program’s
funds were used for bilateral affairs and 10% were used for regional activities. The MEDA II
program was different with MEDA I regarding its priorities because the program will support the
provisions and programs that will be introduced by the Association Agreement for equal
economic and social development for both sides.67
The enactment of the Association Agreement in 2004 worked alongside the MEDA funds
to ensure continuous political dialogue between the two parties and establish provisions for
economic development and social improvement. The agreements paved the way for the creation
of the Association Council and the Association Committee, which ensured the regular
discussions by both parties are held.68
European Neighborhood Policy
Although the EMP has been successful in bringing together the Mediterranean countries
and opened negotiations between them and the EU, it was still very limited regarding its capacity
to reach its targets. Critics emphasized that the problem’s Action Plans be too broad in nature
concerning their scope, especially with the security provisions of the program. Only the trade
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policy of the EMP had been met due to the EU’s growing economic interest in the region. The
adoption of the EuroMed Internal Market Programme in 2002 also ensured the economic policy
under the EMP flourished. The program pushed for market integration between the EU and
partner country, especially in specific sectors of the economy. The EMP also received success in
establishing a partnership for cultural and educational development because both parties believed
it was a vital component to stop security threats. However, the security chapter of the EMP was
challenged by several factors, especially after the September 11 attacks. The EU became anxious
over the possibility of a similar threat happening in Europe, causing the Union to include security
dialogues in other areas of cooperation such as in social and cultural dialogue. Aside from EU’s
anxiety over security-related concerns, the hostilities between the Arab partners and Israel also
affected the EMP’s institutions as representatives from these countries would walk-out from
plenary meetings and prevent dialogue to flourish between parties.69 Critics also highlighted that
the EMP failed to achieve its goals due to the “gap between capabilities and expectations.”70 The
Mediterranean partners argued that the EMP’s policies only serve the European markets more
than permitting equal benefits between the EU and the partner countries. It is not clear to experts
if economic cooperation is improved through the EMP because the progress level for the
improvement of conditions set for the establishment of a free trade zone set to launch in 2010
remains slow. 71
The ENP was launched in 2004 as the parties’ attempt to ensure peace and stability in the
region; while improving programs on economic modernization and human rights protections.
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Originally, the ENP only comprised the Central and Eastern European countries which were
trying to recover from their ordeal as former communist states. However, Spain and Italy had
then suggested that the ENP’s scope included the Southern countries as a means to increase the
reach of the EU, giving it a more active role in aiding countries settle their issues or concerns.
The core premises of the ENP was written in the 2004 Strategy Paper, highlighting the regulation
of cooperation between the southern and eastern countries. This differentiation between the
Mediterranean and former Soviet countries highlighted that the ENP was a “single, inclusive and
coherent framework directed to all neighbors.” The Commission recommended in 2006 to
strengthen the ENP by providing incentives to “privileged partners” from both the southern and
Mediterranean regions, which included Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon,
Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Jordan, Libya, the Palestinian
Authority and Tunisia. The ENP focused on the gradual opening of the Community’s institutions
and programs to the ENP; especially on free trade, illegal migration, and counter-terrorism.72
For the ENP, security is in its top priorities, and one of this key objectives is to improve
security at the borders of the EU and promote stability with partner countries. To attain this
objective, the Union offers partner countries a bargain to gain their cooperation through policies
and programs that would open the region to these partner countries. The conditions of the
bargain would vary depending on the relationship and status of the partner country with the EU,
and the Commitments and Offers are included in the Action Plans highlighting conditionality.
Partners also greatly benefit from additional market access in exchange for their political and
economic reform. Trade and free movement of persons were also introduced as incentives to
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partner countries once they achieve the level close enough for these partner countries to stress
they are similar to the Union’s stability without being a member.73
Under the ENP, EU and Egypt had developed EU-Egypt Action Plan, which was adopted
in March 2007 that strengthened EU and Egypt’s partnership. The Action Plan was considered as
a means for both nations to pursue active economic integration and further cooperation in
political, cultural and social level. Similar to the EMP, the ENP also aims to ensure that all areas
of dialogue between countries can be done to improve Egypt’s economy and society. The ENP
also tackles principles such as joint ownership, development of national plans and reform
programs and reciprocal commitments. The EU-Egypt Action Plan was adopted in the EU-Egypt
Association Council in March 2007 and regularly monitored by several joint bodies to ensure
that the plan is continuously applied. Observers also see that the EU-Egypt Action Plan
contained several points reflected in the Barcelona Process and ensured that democracy and
human rights are sustained while pursuing economic integration. Additional clauses in the
Action Plan, which call for Egypt to negotiations to speak about provisions on external security
with the EU. The EU is also ensuring that the Egypt can handle the improvement of energy
sources and assist in resolving organized crime and other security concerns. Regular Yearly
Progress Reports are also done under the EU-Egypt Action Plan that would highlight the recent
improvements did under the system and the challenges to the effectiveness of the EU-Egypt
Action Plan. It is also considered the major permanent communique between the EU and Egypt.
However, similar to the EMP, the ENP has several issues that reduce its effectiveness as
seen in the EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan. On a general extent, the entire ENP Action Plan
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highlights the general problems in bilateral relations: the problematic authoritarian Egyptian
state, the necessity of deep involvement in settling the development gap and boosting economic
cooperation, and tackling concrete problems involving the peaceful EU. On a procedural level,
the ENP Action Plan confronts the Egyptian government (and other Middle Eastern countries)
with European governance policies which the Middle East does not regularly apply such as
permanent monitoring and evaluation of binding agreements public consultation and publication
of studies or programs, and the inclusion of non-state actors. These governance tools put Middle
Eastern countries at a disadvantage especially as they are not aware of the extent of these
European governance policies and how it would clash with the local system. Egypt, for instance,
adheres to a strict hierarchical system that – in comparison to the European system – the Foreign
Ministry does not have the same capacity as the European Foreign Ministry that could collect
information and distribute a more condensed report to other ministries. In Egypt, the Foreign
Ministry only has a few members who could coordinate with the EU with regards to negotiations
on handling certain threats and even with these in mind, full application of the ENP is still
difficult for Egypt due to the lack of competence and differences on which agency to call
between its ministries on their roles for plan’s enforcement. 74
Union for the Mediterranean
With the shortcomings of the EMP and the ENP, considerations were done by the EU to
ensure that the setbacks seen in both programs would be resolved with another program. The
newest means to revitalize EU-Mediterranean relations was the Union for the Mediterranean
(UfM) which French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed to the European Union to aid the
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region to tackle security and defense measures better for the Mediterranean. He also proposed
the creation of the Mediterranean Union that would also cover the resolution of issues relating to
the environment, energy, and transportation. However, Sarkozy’s proposal had been significant
because he highlighted the key areas lacking in the previous agreements: open dialogue and a
more cohesive EU-Mediterranean relation. Reforms on the leadership of the EU-Mediterranean
Council is also pushed by the Sarkozy's proposal to ensure that meetings can be done equally by
both parties, and all positions are considered when it comes to decision-making. The new Union
would also ensure that the Union would be supporting action when it comes to security.75
Sarkozy’s proposal was immediately reviewed by the Union and slowly tweaked the
program to include certain policies that would allow the new agreement to work even if the
Arab-Israeli Conflict. Although there were still ambiguities in certain bits of the proposal, the
European Council approved the proposal on March 14, 2008, and called the Commission to
announce the “Barcelona Process: The Union for the Mediterranean.” An official communique is
released by the communique on May 20, 2008, and introduced the Union’s framework while
adhering to the Barcelona Process. The first UfM Summit was held on July 13, 2008, and
highlighted the new structure of the EU-Mediterranean partnership. It also aimed to upgrade the
relationship between both parties and Mediterranean states now had equal leverage in the Union.
Although the UfM’s promise was clear in helping equal leverage for both parties, the EU
remains influential when it comes to the relationship of the UfM and the accession countries. The
Arab-Israeli Conflict had also stopped the progress of the UfM as Egypt – which holds the co-
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presidency with France – had stopped all UfM activities when Israel attacked Gaza in December
2008.76
Political conditionality and evaluation of the EU-Egypt relations before the Arab Spring
Considering the various programs that were designed to bolster EU-Egypt affairs, there
were visible lapses that the programs that shook the legitimacy of EU-Egyptian affairs.
Conditionality pertains to the benefits of partnerships with another state, especially in the
improvement of democracy in the region. When the enlargement process took place, the EU
developed its major principles to ensure that countries who wish to become members of the EU
or partners to the EU are properly screened to determine their current political, economic and
social structures and address the conditions that may pose problems for their partnership or
accession to the EU. Upon their release of the EMP in 1995, the EU also added several clauses
when it comes to adding human rights as a critical component of partnership. Negative measures
will become active if a partner has violated the premises of the Association Agreements.77 The
UfM also sets in applying a “multilateral” model that would enhance Euro-Mediterranean
partnership in a political, economic and civil society level that would enable better negotiations
with regards to the programs that will be discussed through the UfM such as infrastructure
development and civil rights protections. Under the UfM, the EU aims to bolster the
modernization of the Mediterranean in order to emphasize the necessity of stability to develop
democratic values and societies the EU wishes for the region to achieve. Experts indicated that
the introduction of the Barcelona Process which instigated the development of the UfM should
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be used by the EU to introduce projects that would establish the foundations for democracy to
flourish which is shared by all partners. It is also the aim of the UfM to establish peace and
stability in the Mediterranean to bolster reform and reduce the impact of any conflicts in the
region.78
However, throughout the EMPs applications in the Mediterranean, it was unable to exert
its power to break off relations even if it was clear there were violations done by the partner
country.79 In Egypt, for example, the EU Delegation in Cairo stressed that while the authoritarian
Egyptian government of Hosni Mubarak had claimed they promoted the agreements under the
EMP, this did not take precedence as the EU discovered that there were still human rights
violations in Egypt. However, the EU never confronted Mubarak’s regime for these cases and
just continued their partnership with Egypt. President Mubarak even ratified Law 1533 of 1999
which restricted freedom of association the country while the discussions for an updated
Associated Agreement were called. Human rights continued to become severe in Egypt
throughout the EMP and even through the ENP. Furthermore, it is also clear that the various
interests of the EU member countries have been hampering the attempts of the EU to impose
political conditionality in Egypt. When the UfM was enacted, the ongoing issues in the global
market and the volatile politics of the region failed to solidify changes in Egypt.80
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Concluding remarks
It is clear in this chapter that European-Egyptian relation goes back before the EU's
establishment as the two have been in close negotiations even in the 1970s. The EU – even while
it was the EEC – provided political, financial, social and cultural assistance to Egypt as a
signatory to various cooperation agreements meant to bolster EU-Egyptian diplomatic affairs.
While each agreement – from the EMP to the UfM – had established the standards on how EUEgyptian relations can be improved and impose reform in Egypt, it was clear that the EU was not
strong enough to make sure that Egypt will adhere to each principle underlined in the EMP,
ENP, and the UfM. The EU does not actively engage Egypt for its violations and let it be for the
sake of democracy. Considering these points, it is a question if the EU would utilize the same
behavior when the Arab Spring affects the country.
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CHAPTER IV: EU-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS IN THE ARAB SPRING
This chapter focuses on the European Union’s reactions towards the changing situation in
Egypt, especially when the Arab Spring has struck the country. The discussions will first begin
with the reports highlighting instability in Egypt before the uprising and the events which
occurred throughout the 2011 Revolution. Following this brief discussion is the assessment of
the EU’s response to the January 2011 uprising and its similarities or differences with EU’s
actions in the Tunisian uprising. The discussion would then cover the EU’s revised policy in the
region in light of the Revolution and then highlight how the EU-Egyptian relations shifted with
the succeeding administrations that took over after Mubarak.
The Revolution and the EU’s Initial Response
The instability in the Arab region has already been noted by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) as they indicated in their research that the region possesses
political, economic and social lapses that could trigger conflict if left unsettled by the Arab
governments. In the first Arab Human Development Report in 2002 commissioned to indicate
the challenges for human development in the region, the UNDP stated that:
“There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions regarding
participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most
of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central
Asia in the late 980s and the early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States. This
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freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful
manifestations of lagging political development.”81
The data from the 2002 report was supported by the subsequent reports released by the
UNDP in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2009 and cited similarities in the region’s political systems such
as the quality of public services, the onset of corruption and grave human rights violations. In
Egypt, the UNDP indicated that while democracy is practiced through the national elections,
their leaders often modify mandated term limits to remain in power. The country – like most
Arab governments – also resort to “legitimacy of blackmail” to gain support from the public and
the international community against the onset of Islamism. Egypt is also reported for its efforts to
restrict the formation of political parties to prevent the growth of opposition to the government.
Under President Hosni Mubarak’s reign, Egypt has also been under a state of emergency that
ensures the government’s total control over the people. The UNDP also reported in its 2008
report that Egypt is amongst the seven nations reported by the Arab Organization for Human
Rights to have grave human rights violations committed by the government as seen in its
treatment of prisoners in the West Bank and Gaza.82
However, it was only in the occurrence of the 2010 Tunisian revolt did a revolution occur
in Egypt, taking the international community in a state of shock upon its occurrence. The public
has continuously pressed the Mubarak regime to impose reform and contain the largest religious
party in the country, the Muslim Brotherhood. The public has also complained against the land
conversion and privatization of state-owned businesses by the government as these conversions
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only benefit Mubarak’s cronies. 83 With the outbreak of the Tunisian Revolution in 2010, the
Egyptian civil society groups mobilized through social media and other channels to get support
from the public and on January 25, 2011, 20,000 participants marched to Cairo and key cities in
the country to call for Mubarak’s resignation. Mubarak tried to stop the protests by announcing
on January 29 that he will impose reform in the government. He filled the 30-year vacant Vice
President slot with the appointment of Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s Director of the General
Intelligence Directorate to appease the public. 84 However, the public still fought for the
resignation of Mubarak to trigger reform in the country. Although Mubarak announced on
February 1 that he will respect the September election results, the public remained in Tahrir
Square in Cairo to pressure Mubarak’s resignation. When it was clear to Mubarak that he has lost
control over the public and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which has been
convened in light of the civil unrest. The 25-member body supported the calls of the public for
reform in the group’s first declaration on February 10, 2011. On February 11, 2011, Mubarak
resigned from office.85
When the Arab Spring’s first wave had struck in January 2011 in Egypt, the EU had been
caught off-guard as they did not consider the protests can present such an impact on the region
and the EU-Mediterranean relations. The Union did not realize the significance of the entire
crisis, but they realized that they had to keep up with the changing dynamics lest they find
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themselves unable to keep up with the new changes in the region. 86 There was a lack of
consensus among the European capitals as to how they would act by the changes in the region.
Their failure to recognize the importance of the conflict and the continued disagreements
between member countries disabled the EU from establishing a unified framework that would
respond to the Arab Spring. Throughout the duration of the Egyptian Uprising of 2011, the EU
was hesitant in actively stressing their position because their actions would be detrimental to
their political and strategic interests in the country.87 Critics argued that the EU adopted a “wait
and see” strategy to determine which protests would usher change. The idle strategy had earned
the EU criticisms from critics and the Egyptian people who thought the EU would support their
calls for Mubarak to resign from office.88 However, member countries did make their stance
known regarding the Egyptian crisis such as Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi
had praised President Mubarak’s actions on February 4, 2011 and stated:
“I hope that in Egypt, there can be a transition toward a more democratic system without
a break from President Mubarak, who in the West, above all in the United States, is
considered the wisest of men and a precise reference point.”89
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SCAF Period and EU Action
After Mubarak stepped down from office, the SCAF took over the country and assisted in
the transition process on February 11, 2012.
SCAF Transition
The ease on assuming full executive and legislative authority in the country was easy for
the SCAF due to the popularity it had from the public, dissolving the parliament and suspended
the 1971 constitution. The SCAF appointed a committee on February 15, 2011 to identify areas
for reform regarding the constitution and election process for both parliamentary and presidential
elections. The committee was led by Tareq El-Beshry, a legal expert supporting an Islamist
ideology, and under his leadership, the results of the study were released on February 26,
highlighting several amendments to the constitution that would reorganize the election process.
Some of these amendments included an eligibility criteria and term limits for both the president
and parliamentary members. The committee also included amendments on the drafting
procedures for the new constitution involving both houses of Parliament to select 100 members
to assist with the writing the text of the constitution.90
The committee’s recommendations were approved through popular referendum on March
19 and integrated to the SCAF’s March 23 declaration. The amendments were originally
supported by the public due to the fact they believed these were “amendments”; however, the
military had used this chance to slip in details from the previous constitution and give power to
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the current military rule.91 With the enactment of the constitutional declaration on March 23, the
roadmap for the parliamentary elections would begin in six months. However, observers argued
that the provision’s applied by the SCAF in light of the March 23 declaration would extend the
transition and delay the start of elections from late September (the start of filing for candidacy
for the lower house) to late February 2012 (the last round of voting for the upper house). The
reason the SCAF applied the provisions is to allegedly provide non-Islamist groups time to
organize their campaigns.92 The SCAF further stalled the parliamentary elections on November
28 by stressing some doubts over the original roadmap. In their statements, the SCAF feared the
potential rise of an Islamist-dominated parliament that would control the drafting of the
constitution. Although the March 23 declaration extended the transition process, the SCAF
adhered to Article 60 of the declaration and cited that parliamentary elections were to precede
writing the constitution and it would be the parliament who would decide the committee that
would continue the rewriting of the constitution.93
To prevent the possibility of an Islamist-dominated parliament, the SCAF tried to alter
the course for the transition through media campaigns such as its declaration on October 20,
2011. General Mahmoud El-Assar suggested to move the presidential elections on mid-2013
which is the same time as the deadline for adopting a new constitution. This decision of the
SCAF to influence the transition process alienated both Islamists and non-Islamists who saw it as
a ploy to control the public. Insecurity started to spread throughout the country due to the
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SCAF’s continuous delays on the elections. From September to October 2011, violent protests
occurred throughout the country in an attempt to oust the military government. However,
military prosecuted activists and handed them harsh sentences before military tribunals.
On November 25, protesters went to Tahrir Square to call for a transfer of power from the
SCAF to a civilian government. Regardless of the protests, the parliamentary elections continued
on November with the Freedom and justice parity capturing 36% of the vote and 43% of the total
seats in the lower-house while the Al-Nour took 27% of the vote and 24% of the seats. Smaller
parties created after the revolution like “The Revolution Continues” only won 3% of the votes
and 1.4% in the lower-house. The results of the parliamentary elections still retained the tensions
within Egypt as Non-Islamists argued that the SCAF should transfer its power to the civilians
prior to the presidential elections. On the anniversary of the January 25 uprising, protests
centered to the arguments the SCAF should consider on shifting its power to the civilian
politicians. The Muslim Brotherhood also supported this call for a transfer of power on March
2012. The continuous arguments regarding the transfer of power persisted throughout the
presidential campaigns with the parliament denying the candidacy of the several key SCAF
members and former members of the Mubarak regime. 94
EU Action Throughout SCAF Period
Meanwhile, as the SCAF continued to usher transition in Egypt despite the criticisms of
several parties, the EU’s response on the Arab Spring was formally released on March 8, 2011
with the joint communique of the High Representative/Vice President Catherine Ashton and the
Commission proposing for “A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the
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Southern Mediterranean.” The proposal stressed the need for the EU to support the demand for
active political participation and protection of equal opportunities for the public. It also proposed
for the “more for more” principle which would open assistance to recipient countries on the basis
mutual accountability and adherence to reform.95The communique also indicated that the EU
intends to revise the ENP to keep up with the changing southern developments because the EU
was ill-prepared to respond to the crisis in the first two months of 2011 to deliver their Union’s
full support. To prevent a potential setback to EU action, the new ENP proposed through the
communique ‘should be a policy of the Union with the Member States aligning their own
bilateral efforts in support of its overall policy objectives.’96
The proposal to revise the provisions of the ENP was seen differently by the EU
institution leaders such as EU President Herman Van Rompuy, Commission for Enlargement and
Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and
HR Ashton. For Van Rompuy, a revision to the ENP is not essential to respond to the Middle
Eastern crisis but a full enactment of the provisions of the ENP which were not applied in early
years as these unapplied provisions on security and political change would ensure that
democracy and restoration of relations is secured between the EU and the Mediterranean.97 In the
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case of Fule, he supported the use of the old ENP because of the fact it already has a very clear
framework on how to achieve cooperation, democracy promotion and human rights protection
which the new Egyptian government may now be able to apply.98 Despite these sentiments from
van Rompuy and Fule, the ENP was revised under the request of HR Ashton and President
Barroso to promote a three-fold response that would highlight the ENP’s objectives: emphasizing
“Deep democracy”, economic development, and renewed connections between people. The New
ENP would also try to promote “Sustainable stability” in order to ensure that Mediterranean
countries experiencing transition like Egypt would be supported accordingly.99
The new approach to the ENP was further elaborated in the May 25, 2011 with the launch
of a “New Response to the Changing Neighborhood.” The new approach to the ENP highlighted
two major challenges that it aims to resolve on a short-term and long-term period. The first
challenge the EU will tackle with the new ENP is the creation on “deep democracy” which
would boost the improvement of civil society and enable them to take part in the transition
process. The EU would also push for inclusive and sustainable economic growth and
development which would influence the stability of democracy in the region. 100 The new ENP –
as highlighted by the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared prosperity with the Southern
Mediterranean” in March 2011 – would also reflect the principles which it was based on.
-

Differentiation: Advocates for flexibility for any type of development. This would also
ensure that the developments and subsequent approaches would take into consideration
the differences between the eastern and southern halves of the ENP, especially when it
98
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comes to full integration and partnership. The implications of this principle would
indicate that the EU recognizes the fact not all countries would be able to achieve or
willing to obtain a specific level of integration with the EU and to bolster these countries
to achieve results, the EU would apply tailor-made strategies that would improve their
success rate.
-

More-for-more: this principle highlights the clauses on providing incentives to ENP
partners, especially to ensure that these Mediterranean partners would adhere to the
premises of the ENP (ex. Support for free and fair elections). This principle also opens
the ENP partner to better cooperation with other members and achieve higher standards
for political and social development.

-

Less-for-less: Under this principle, the EU aims to utilize a restrictive set of measures to
ensure that violators of human rights and democracy would be properly sanctioned and
ensure that EU funding or assistance would be reduced in lieu of the crime committed.
This principle would also highlight the EU’s focus on strengthening civil society sectors
and the reallocation of EU assistance if a recipient country fails to establish better reform
in their countries.

-

Joined-Up: This principle highlights the importance of regional partnerships and the
involvement of critical EU institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to ensure assistance.
Under this principle, the EU would be working closely with other international donors
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through the Deauville Partnership, which was established as a coordination scheme for
international financial institutions to reach out to key actors such as the EU.101
The new version of the ENP also has three major elements considered to ensure stronger
relations: democratic transformation and institution building, sustainable and inclusive growth
and economic development, and finally, strong partnership with the people. These three elements
are elaborated in the “Three Ms” also included in the May 25, 2011 communique that detailed
the ENP’s new frameworks, stressing that the incentives - money, mobility and markets – would
ensure cooperation from recipient countries. Collectively, these three factors are expected to
deliver the resources necessary for sustainable change.102
Money
The EU announced on May 2011 that it will provide an additional 1.24 billion euros
worth of funding for ENP partners on top of the original 5.7 billion euros already allocated for
the ENP for the 2011-2013 period under the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument
(ENPI) which handles the ENP’s budget. The EU had also created the Support to Partnership,
Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) program that would open 350 million euros worth of
financial assistance from 2011 to 2013 which would support the more-for-more principles of the
new ENP. The Commission had also opened several programs and investments for small and
medium enterprises. The Civil Society Facility had also been opened to distribute 22 million
euros in order to boost the capacity of civil service organizations and their influence in boosting
democracy promotion and application in their respective countries. The EBRD had also provided
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funding activities in 2011 in order to support Egyptian efforts to boost their commitments for
multiparty democracy and market economics. The International Monetary Fund is also working
alongside the EU to apply the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) for Egypt amounting to 500
million euros worth of loans. The MFA was created to complement IMFs financing to long-term
loans or grants programs and can only be available to countries already assisted by the IMF’s
programs.103
Market
The EU also applied several initiatives to boost the capacity of Mediterranean countries
to access EU’s internal market and enable investment to flow to these partner countries. One of
the major initiatives the EU introduced in light of the Arab Spring in Egypt and other Arab
nations is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs). The DCFTAs opens new
opportunities for partner countries to gain access to the EU’s internal market.104 To establish
easier adoption of the Free Trade Areas, the Council provided the Commission a mandate to
initiate negotiations between the EU and Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia to take part in the
DCFTAs on December 14, 2011. In the statement of EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht,
he said that:
“We are offering Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia progressive economic integration
into the EU single market and want to improve the conditions for market access to the EU
for these WTO members as they engage in a process of democratic and economic
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reform… Our door is open for other Southern Mediterranean partners once the same
conditions are met.”105
The creation of the DCFTA is also included in the provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreements, which include several policies that would ensure trade and investment
measures that would be applied by the partner country to ensure continuous progress. Regional
integration is also taken into perspective by the Free Trade Areas, especially for countries who
have joined the Agadir Agreement in 2001: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan.106
Mobility
Finally, to ensure that the ENP would boost further integration in the region, the revised
ENP would include better means to allow Southern Mediterranean partners to move within the
EU-Mediterranean partnership. The idea of improved mobility has already been introduced to the
EU and the Mediterranean countries since 2007’s “Communication on circular migration and
mobility partnership between the European Union and the Third countries.” 107 Mobility
partnerships were designed to improve migration policies, border security and job opportunities.
It is said that both parties would benefit the partnership greatly as the EU would be able to
improve its border security while the partner country would ensure that their citizens can freely
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travel in these European countries and get assistance in improving their security efforts. In light
of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the Commission introduced on May 24, 2011 the ‘Dialogue for
migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries.’ The Dialogue will
begin discussions to ensure that migration, mobility and security would be considered for better
mobility between the two regions.

108

Aside from the ‘Dialogue for migration, mobility and

security with the Southern Mediterranean countries’, the EU launched better border management
systems to ensure that security is airtight for the partner countries and for the EU without risking
mobility. The EU created the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) to improve the
EU’s security capacity to deal with border protection. The EUROSUR would also develop a
“pre-frontier intelligence picture” which would help the EU and their partner countries in the
Mediterranean to detect threats before they make it to the borders.109
Aside from the March 8 and May 25 EU declarations that would revise the EU’s foreign
policy in the Arab Region and Egypt, a clear statement from the EU regarding the Egyptian
Revolution was released in December 1, 2011 in the 3130th Foreign Affairs Council meeting of
the EU Council. Six conclusions were raised by the EU Council regarding Egypt and they are as
follows:
-

The Council welcomed the peaceful start of the parliamentary elections in Egypt on
November 28 and praised the high voter turnout to the political transition. The EU hopes
that the peaceful and transparent process will continue especially on the June 2012
presidential elections.
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-

The Council also pushed for the swift transition to civilian rule and the SCAF must
protect the right people and ensure this transition is done as soon as possible. The SCAF
is also asked to engage with all political and civil society groups in a open dialogue to
uphold democracy, freedom and human rights.

-

The EU also stressed their concern on the violence occurring in Egypt prior to the
beginning of the election period. The Council urged restraint for all parties and
investigations regarding the violence that occurred in the election period.

-

The Council also indicated their concern regarding the dwindling economic situation in
Egypt and the EU conveyed their support to Egypt for social and economic reform.

-

The EU also iterated their support for a democratic and stable Egypt as a key partner in
the Mediterranean and Middle East region.

-

And finally, the EU will continue to stand by Egypt for their quest for freedom and
democratic transition.110
In December 18, 2011, HR/VP Ashton also emphasized the EU’s position over the

Egyptian crisis. She stated that the EU is against the growing violence occurring in the country
and also stressed that law and order must be protected despite public protests. The statement also
called for the government and investigate those who have triggered the onset of violence in these
protests and bring them to justice. Ashton also said that:
“Egypt is in a middle of a crucial and difficult transformation process. The democratic
electoral process should continue in a safe and transparent environment.” 111
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In light of the 2012 Egyptian presidential elections, the EU sent members of the
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) to oversee the campaigns and
the election. The EIDHR was established to train local election observers, media, political parties
and civil society sectors to boost their participation in the election process. Egypt also received
technical support from the EIDHR for the presidential elections. The EIDHR also assisted
nonpolitical actors and organizations which are not legally registered to take part in the
elections.112 However, in the application of the revised ENP, it was difficult for the EU to keep
up with the expectations of the Egyptian people, especially in the issue of democratization. The
Egyptian people wanted the EU to contribute not just economic support to the country, but also
political, technical and legal support to help their ailing institutions. The people wanted a more
assertive EU, especially in the parliamentary elections and help in the education of election
officers and observers. The Egyptian people also wanted the EU to expand on its economic
policies with the Egyptian people, especially now that the Egyptian economy needs assistance in
recovering from the previous regime.113 The Egyptian people wanted the EU to work actively in
designing a suitable economic program for the country. The EU is also expected by the Egyptian
people to take an important role in developing the country’s civil society. While the EU does
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have active policies for the assistance requested by CSOs and the economy, the Egyptian people
see that it is not enough in pushing for democracy in the region. Considering all these
expectations, the Union was unable to keep up with these points and the lack of dialogue also
prevented progress from taking place between the Union and the SCAF.114
The first round of the presidential elections took place on May 23-24, 2012 and while the
names Mohammed Morsi of the Freedom and Justice Party and former Prime Minister Ahmed
Shafiq were prominent in the polls, the results of the first round reflected that 50% of the voters
voted for “Revolutionary” candidates whom they believe could represent them in the
government. However, both Morsi and Shafiq gained more leverage due to the political
machinery supporting their campaigns. Before the second round of the presidential polls, the
SCAF continued to pressure political parties in agreeing to a constituent assembly developed by
the Parliament and agree to the guidelines on the drafting of the constitution. The military
council spoke with both non-Islamist and Islamist parties regarding the constituent assembly
despite the case before the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) that would dissolve the
Parliament and pressure the SCAF to amend the Constitutional Declaration that may limit the
power of the Presidency. Negotiations; however, failed to reach a definite conclusion as nonIslamist members from the established constituent assembly accused Islamist members for not
following the 50% Islamist population on the assembly. Non-Islamists argue that the constituent
assembly included even moderate Islamist parties and other religious parties gained seats even if
these seats are reserved for the non-Islamist parties.115
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On June 14, 2012, the SCC ruled that the Political Exclusion Law passed in May 2012 to
prevent Mubarak’s former officials from running into office was deemed unconstitutional. The
SCC also ruled that the electoral law that was used to establish the People’s Assembly was also
unconstitutional. With this SCC’s decision, the People’s Assembly should be dissolved because
it was created unconstitutionally. The decision also put into question the military-led transition
and the results of the election process. The second round of the elections came on June 16-17,
2012 despite the lack of definite constitution and uncertain government structure with unclear
responsibilities. Further uncertainty in the Egyptian voting population was also brought by the
dissolution of the parliament as it signaled further uncertainty over the transition period. The
SCAF tried to establish further changes by promulgating an addendum to the March 30
declaration which would make the military an autonomous entity that can legislate, taking over
the position of the People’s Assembly while a new body is established. The addendum also
enabled the SCAF to select the 100-member constituent assembly and changed the rules on how
parties can oppose the draft text of the constitution. Political forces, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, argued against the SCAF addendum, stressing that the military body does not have
the power to put forward an interim constitution. Despite this unstable political atmosphere, the
presidential elections continued and on June 24, Farouk Sultan of the Presidential Election
Commission (PEC) announced that Mohammed Morsi won against Ahmed Shafiq with a vote
percentage of 51.73%.116
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Morsi- EU Relations
Upon the election of Mohammed Morsi on June 24, 2012, the HR/VP immediately
expressed her congratulations to the new Egyptian president, stressing that Morsi’s election is a
“major milestone in Egypt’s democratic transition and an historic moment for the country and
the region.” It is also the hope of the HR/VP to engage with Morsi’s government whom she
believes will represent the people and bolster civil participation from all political and social
groups.117 Morsi’s first few months in office promised changes to the EU as he visited Brussels
on September 2012 to speak with the EU with regards to further assistance. Morsi’s visit was
vital for the country and his credentials because EU aid can ensure recovery from a sluggish
economy. Morsi first spoke with Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, who offered
macro-financial assistance worth $647 million if Egypt signs an agreement with the IMF.
However, to sign this IMF agreement, Egypt would have to agree to slash its energy subsidies
which absorbs a fifth of the country’s spending. The EU is also considering an additional $259
million budget support for Egypt for an economic recovery plan. These new financial programs
would come on top the $581 million financial assistance the EU has already allotted to Egypt
from 2011 to 2013 for the youth sector. In light of the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Libya in
Benghazi, Morsi raised a strong position and said. “We [Egypt] are eager to protect visitors,
tourists, diplomatic missions, public and private properties. We are required by God to respect
them and to be custodians of those visitors and we know that if one person is killed without
117
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justification, it is as if someone has killed all of humanity.”118 He had also met with European
Council President Herman van Rompuy to reestablish talks regarding EU-Egyptian relations. 119
The revised talks between EU and Egypt enabled the establishment of the EU-Egypt Task
Force in November 2012 under the chairmanship of HR/VP Ashton on November 13-14.
Throughout the discussions of the Task Force, the EU and its financial institutions (EBRD and
the EIB) pledged nearly 5 billion euros to provide long-term assistance to Egypt through various
frameworks. The Commission committed to financial support of over 800 million euros for
grants and loans. At least 303 million euros would be placed for grants and 450 million would be
allotted to loans. The EIB would also be opening a lending program of over 1 billion euros per
year and the EBRD also announced they would be increasing their lending volumes to Egypt by
up to 1 billion per year.120
. In her speech in light of the establishment of the task force, HR Ashton stated:
“20 months ago, people in Egypt gathered in Tahrir Square to demand political and social
and economic rights. Since that day, this country has come a long way. But, the people
continue to drive the demand and it is they that inspire us all to gather here today. The
holding of democratic presidential elections is a historic landmark for this country.

118

Magda Fahsi. "Egyptian President Morsi in Brussels Seeks to Reassure Europeans." MintPress News.

September 26, 2012. http://www.mintpressnews.com/egyptian-president-morsi-in-brussels-seeks-to-reassureeuropeans/37797/ (accessed December 1, 2015).
119
120

Fahsi. "Egyptian President Morsi in Brussels Seeks to Reassure Europeans."
European Commission. "Eu-Egypt relations." European Commission: Press Release Database. August

21, 2013. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-751_en.htm (accessed November 30, 2015).

68

President Morsi has impressed the European Union not just with what he says but his
commitment.”121
Although they were supportive over the promise Morsi’s regime would bring to Egypt,
the EU did not realize that his election was not “democratic” despite the presence of the
Constituent Assembly and the Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood had taken over every sector
of the country and exploited democracy for their own agenda. The Morsi administration also
established constitutional decrees to retain control over the public. The most notable
constitutional decree applied by the Morsi administration was the November 22, 2012 decree
which stressed that:
1. the public prosecutor would be dismissed, with the President appointing his
replacement
2. All trials against government officials from the previous regime, including their
conspirators, would be reopened while being monitored by an ad hoc prosecutor that has
additional powers that they can use when intervening in issues brought before them.
3. No judicial authority could dissolve the Assembly or the Shura Council
4. No judicial authority can cancel any policy, declaration, and law applied since June 30,
2012 and any lawsuit that would be brought forward against these policies will be
dismissed and voided.
5. The president could take any measures he sees fit to preserve the legacy of the
revolution and protect national security.122
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With the control of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the country and the decrees the
Morsi administration applied, it was becoming clear that the country remains volatile especially
when the Islamist-inspired Constitution was finally adopted in the latter half of 2012.
Considering Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, they were blamed for the current
status of the country and the failed political changes they promised in the elections.
Mismanagement was reported in terms of the country’s budget and political compromises were
not done by the government to establish political stability. 123

June 30th Revolt and the Transition
With the unstable political environment in Morsi’s Egypt, public protests took place in
many critical parts of the country to call for Morsi’s resignation. The Egyptian Armed Forces
had imprisoned Morsi and his fellow Muslim Brotherhood members in July 2013. His removal
had brought concerns to raise back to the EU, especially as they declared their support to
president Morsi as the first democratically elected leader of Egypt after the Egyptian
Revolution.124 The EU immediately released a statement following the ousting of Mohammed
Morsi on July 4, 2013. In the official statement of HR/VP Ashton, she stated that the EU calls for
swift action in Egypt to stabilize the country. She expressed hope that all sides return to the
democratic process and hold new presidential and parliamentary elections and the reenactment of
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the constitution. The EU also condemned the violent clashes that occurred between rival political
factions after Morsi was removed from office by the army. 125 It was difficult for the EU to
highlight their position regarding the military regime under Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi because it may
put EU-Egyptian relations in jeopardy. In a declaration made for the EU of HR/VP Ashton, the
EU declared that:
“The military must accept and respect the constitutional authority of the civilian power as
a basic principle of democratic governance. It is of utmost importance that Egypt returns
rapidly to a legitimate government and democratic structures responding to the
democratic and socioeconomic aspirations of the Egyptian people… The EU calls for a
broad-based and substantial dialogue, inclusive of all those political forces committed to
democratic principles… A successful outcome will depend on the free participation of all
political actors, including the Freedom and Justice Party, which we encourage to do
so.”126
HR Ashton had also met up with US Secretary of State John Kerry to try organize a
better solution to the situation in Egypt. Both Ashton and Kerry – in a joint statement –
highlighted that both the US and the EU ‘support basic democratic principles, not any particular
personalities or parties.’ HR/VP Ashton also made several high profile meetings in Egypt to
speak with the new Egyptian officials Al-Sisi regarding the transition process. Several violent
clashes had occurred throughout August 2013 between the government and the pro-Morsi
125
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supporters, which led to several casualties. Ashton called for an urgent Foreign Affairs Minister
Meeting on August 21, 2013 in light of the developments in Egypt. The results of the meeting
were declared on September 11, 2013, stressing that the EU had been firm in their efforts to fight
for democracy and will continue to support the fight of the people to aim for democracy.127
It was also difficult for the EU to establish negotiations under the current leadership
because the pro-EU Egyptian key figures have been removed from power after the crackdown of
the interim government. One of those key figures Mohamed ElBaradei who resigned due to the
violence triggered by the interim government. He is even charged for his actions because he
resigned from his post. The Tamarod party used to support the US and the EU efforts in the
region but they have slowly become nationalist in nature, triggering the calls for the boycott on
the Israeli peace treaty and the American military aid. The resulting violence triggered by the
violent manipulations of the current regime forced Europe to stop all arms sales that would
permit these arms to be used within the country.128 The measure is said to also ensure that small
arms would no longer be permitted. However, this decision by the EU is not that strong
considering the current hold of the military in the country. Even if the army would run out of
bullets and weapons, they can still gain arms through their neighbors and other allies such as
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Russia and the United Arab Emirates.129 The EU was also unable to
reach out to the Muslim Brotherhood even if they were in contact with the group since 2012. It
became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood was not even aware of the recommendations and
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criticisms being implied by the EU when its officials visit the country when the negotiations
during the July 2013..130
Experts indicated that if the EU asserted a stronger position in Egypt, they could do so by
suspending aid, withdraw its emissaries, and call on a common demarche on the Egyptian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their actions.131 While the EU can still enforce such actions, it
was clear that they were unwilling to challenge the current government given the importance of
the region to EU’s political, economic and social interests. Egypt is an important defense against
the growing influence of extremism in the region and caused the EU to accept the government.
The EU and even the US even show signs that they agree with Al-Sisi’s takeover because it
would mean the Egyptian government would not stray away from the growing violence in the
Sinai region. Individual member countries have even expressed hope that the Egyptian
government would have immense power to restore order in the Sinai region. The EU also is now
fighting against the growing influence of other countries trying to get 132
When the Presidential elections was held, the EU was unable to monitor the event after
their security and safety equipment was stopped from being brought into Cairo. With only
elections assessment teams in the capital to monitor the Egyptian election, the EU expressed
concerns that they will not be able to determine the veracity of the results and if the elections are
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done in consideration with the political issues called by the public. The EU also pushed for the
election of a pluralist government 133

Al-Sisi’s Egypt – EU relations
On June 8, 2014, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi had formally assumed office as the country’s
seventh president and many were not as surprised with his victory given his popularity with the
public. In his inauguration speech, Al-Sisi said that Egypt will play an active role in the regional
and international level as Egypt will recover and become a strong and just state under his rule.
He also stressed that he hopes Egypt would enter a “full renaissance on both the internal and
external levels.” Al-Sisi stressed that security and change is a must in Egypt, but he only said
terrorism once. He also stressed that the new Egypt in his tenure would emphasize in education
and employment for the people.134 It was also visible in Al-Sisi’s speech that he thanked the Gulf
nations for their support after the 2013 revolt. The Gulf provided financial assistance to the 2013
transition government that replaced Morsi in July 2013. Without Gulf assistance, Egypt would
have been destitute and unable to establish reform under the transition period.135 For the Gulf
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nations, they praised Al-Sisi and expressed their support in his leadership. King Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia called for the support of all the friends of Egypt to support Sisi and asked
Egyptians to fight against the “foreign chaos” occurring in the region for the past three years.
Aside from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran had also supported Sisi’s election and Iran’s attendance
in the inauguration ceremony brought the message of a potential Egyptian-Iranian partnership to
reassure the Gulf.136
For the EU, their relationship with Al-Sisi’s Egypt was stable and congratulated him for
his victory, hoping that the new government would work with the Union in a “constructive
partnership.”137 Following his elections, Sisi has visited Italy and France in November 2014 to
re-establish bilateral talks between the two sides. Sisi also visited Cyprus and Spain in April
2015 to discuss bilateral relations between the EU and Egypt. Aside from these state visits, AlSisi’s Egypt had also made contact with the EU in the Sharm-el-Sheikh economic development
summit on March 13-15, 2015. The summit, with the title ‘Egypt is the Future’ aims to support
the development of the Egyptian economy and boost participation from the international partners
to support Egyptian growth. According to Prime Minister Ibrahim Mehleb, the summit also aims
to boost Egypt’s appeal to investors and implement economic and social reforms.138 During the
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Sharm-el-Sheikh summit, the EU and the Egyptian Government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) and Joint declarations to support Egyptian development with a grant
amounting to 130 million euros. The MoU highlights the development of the EU Single Support
Framework (SSF) for Egypt for 2014-2015 that would indicate the bilateral agreements Egypt
agreed with the EU for the period. The SSF for 2014-2015 includes the following priority areas:
Poverty Alleviation and Economic/Social Protection (40%), Governance, Transparency and
Business Environment (20%) and Quality of life (40%).
Meanwhile, the Joint Declaration between the Egyptian government and the EU reflects
the agreement between both parties in 2014 to develop three grant programs that would increase
EU contribution to 130 million. These grant programs are following: "Access to Education and
Protection for at Risk Children" programme (30 million euros), "Household Natural Gas
Connection" (68 million euros) and "Kafr El Sheikh Wastewater Expansion" programme (32
million euros). 139 The EIB had also signed a loan of 120 million euros for the National Bank of
Egypt (NBE) to support private sector in Egypt; especially small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs). The EIB supported Egypt to improve the Egyptian SMEs to promote productivity and
competitiveness of the Egyptian economy. The EU had also launched the EU Joint Rural
Development Programme in the Sharm-el-Sheikh Summit. The program has a budget of 39
million euros which would be used for the agricultural and rural sectors of Egypt. Rural
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development under the project would be handled by the Italian Cooperation Office that would
handle EU grants.140
However, the EU could not easily influence the development of democracy in the country
considering the shaky relationship it shares with the Al-Sisi government. Although Al-Sisi had
made it a point to visit European countries after being voted into office, many EU leaders had
called against his continuous use of violence to silence opposition leaders and called for the
transfer of power in the country to civilian leaders and not from the military before they provide
aid. The EU had even ordered the cancellation of its delegation’s arrival in Egypt to monitor the
elections in the country and pose an impasse between the two nations. The EU also rejected the
current human rights status in the country and for Egypt, that is a major blow alongside its
refusal to watch the parliamentary elections. These two decisions of the EU eventually curtailed
its influence from affecting the Al-Sisi regime and disabled further talks from flourishing
between each country. Egypt had prepared several ways for the country to regain EU’s trust in
the region, but analysts believe that the tactics used by EU regarding the Al-Sisi regime issues
were a ploy to pressure the country in supporting EU’s interests in the region.141
Despite the protests and concerns regarding the EU-Al Sisi relations, it has been
reaffirmed by EU foreign policy Chief Federica Mogherini that Egypt and the EU have very
stable relations under the Al-Sisi government. In her visit to the recovering country, Mogherini
had congratulated Egypt on the signs of a potential parliament that would match international
140
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democratic standards and boost up Egypt’s capacity to deal with several regional issues.
Mogherini’s visit was done to enhance discussions between Egypt and the EU and tackled
critical issues such as the Libyan crisis and the common issues dealt in the country such as illegal
immigration and terrorism.142
Democracy Promotion of the EU After the Arab Spring in Egypt
With the end of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the EU has undergone several negotiations to
determine how democracy can be reintroduced in Egypt considering its image as a major actor
on democracy promotion worldwide after the US. In response to the crisis, the EU – through the
EC and the EEAS launched the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP),
which aimed to establish a framework that would allow partner countries establish reform to
accommodate the short-term effects of the Arab Spring to their respective territories. The PfDSP
identified three major priorities in its framework that would assist in development:
transformation of democracy and the establishment of associated institutions, the creation of
people-to-people channels and the promotion of inclusive economic development. Upon its
application in Egypt, NGOs and CSOs were provided financial reform by the EU to become
involved with citizens’ development. 143
The revised ENP also had provisions which highlighted democracy promotion,
promoting a ‘deep democracy’ framework’ which is deeply embedded in its more-for-more/less142
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for-less principle. The renewed framework of the ENP also indicated that aside from the
encouragement of the free elections, it also aims to provide assistance to CSOs and NGOs which
are integral in contributing the achievability of stable transition to democracy by the region.144
Aside from the ENP and the PfDSP, the EU also introduced the European Endowment for
Democracy which was also indicated in the revised ENP in 2011. The EED aims to promote
democracy in countries like Egypt which currently has an unstable relationship with the EU.
Since it is autonomous from the EU, it can provide funding for partner countries without seeking
approval from the EU and assist in the establishment of the most effective means in introducing
democracy and reform. The EED also offers its own range of programs that would aid relevant
actors identified to be critical actors in democracy promotion. However, it does have limited
budget of over 14 million euros for the entire region. It is also unclear as to the extent of the
operations of the EED due to the lack of clear framework and aims of its actions in the region,
especially in Egypt.145
Concluding Remarks
It is undeniable in this chapter that the Arab Spring’s impact in Egypt is profound, not
just in the stability of the country but also for the continuous existence of the EU-Egyptian
relations. Like the rest of the international community, the EU has been taken off-guard by the
event and disabled immediate action from occurring especially due to the importance of the
region to the political and economic interests of the EU and its members. However, once it has
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taken time to understand the crisis, the Union launched several instruments to ensure that
negotiations for democracy promotion and reestablishment of EU-Egyptian affairs such as in the
revision of the ENP and the grants provided to the Egyptian government. Despite achieving
some success in fostering change in Egypt especially with the introduction of democracy
promotion programs like the EED and the PfDSP, the unstable political environment in Egypt
disabled the EU’s programs from taking root despite the grants given to the government. The
following chapter adds additional arguments which supports the argument that the EU is still
incapable of introducing reform through its foreign policy as discussion would be analyzing the
impact of the EU member countries and the EU’s institutions in influencing the capacity of EU
foreign policy.
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CHAPTER V: THE IMPACTS OF EU’S STRUCTURE AND MEMBER COUNTRIES
TO ITS FOREIGN POLICY EFFECTIVENESS
This chapter focuses on the structure and member countries of the EU aiming to assess
the ways and the extent to which these two factors influenced the EU foreign policy towards
Egypt following the Arab Uprising. A critical analysis of the impacts of the individual member
countries of the EU – specifically the impact of the German, French, Italian and British action on the coherence of EU action is the first topic discussed in this chapter. The discussions would
include how member countries are influenced with their sentiments on political Islam, the Arab
Spring and political conditionality. This chapter will also cover an analysis as to how the EU’s
complex structure and decision-making influenced the EU’s foreign policy initiatives. The
discussion would also include the limitations that was met by the EU in pushing for its policies
in Egypt.
Impacts of the Member Countries on EU’s policy toward Egypt
Considering the changing Egyptian political climate, the EU was unable to sustain its
action’s effectiveness because each member country had different intentions when it came to
handling relations with Egypt and the ruling regime there and how the EU should act
accordingly. Currently, the EU has 28 member countries with each member has his separate
national histories, traditions, constitutions and political systems that make the EU unique in its
way collectively. Six factors influence the relationship and role of member countries in the EU
and they are the following: entry date, size, wealth, state structure, economic ideology and
integration preferences.146 In terms of the entry date, the 28 member countries are divided into
146
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five different groups. The first six countries were the founding members of the EU which have
developed a consensus on European integration as an alternative for the repeated military
conflicts between European powers. Germany and France had been the key countries that
developed the idea of European integration. In the 1980s and the 1990s, European integration
was further deepened with the introduction of aspects such as the European Monetary System
and the single market. Both nations still remain at the center of the EU. The four remaining
founding countries – Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands – are frontrunners for
development and deeper integration. These four countries were also deeply committed to the
Community method on law-making and push for a stronger Union.147
However, this stance of the Benelux countries and Italy changed in recent years. For the
Benelux countries, their cooperation in the EU was lukewarm at best after the introduction of the
Constitutional Treaty.148 The Constitutional Treaty was developed as a result of the Convention
on the Future of Europe signed in 2004. The Treaty establishes institutional reform, adoption of a
charter of fundamental rights and consolidation of existing treaties. The treaty was intentionally
created to bring the EU closer to the people; however, before the treaty can be applied, there is a
necessity that all member states ratify the treaty. By 2007, only 18 of the 27 member countries
had ratified the Treaty but in the case of the Netherlands and France, the Treaty was rejected in
referenda in 2005. To gain the support of the other countries who has yet to accept the Treaty,
European leaders agreed to abandon the idea of developing a ‘constitution’ and just amend the
pre-existing treaties. The 2007 decision also avoided all mention of the constitutional symbols
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This revised treaty is known today as the “Reform Treaty”
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or the Lisbon Treaty. 149 Despite the compromises imposed on the treaty, both Belgium and
Denmark argued against the text of the Lisbon Treaty especially on the issue of scrutiny rights
for national parliaments.150 Italy, on the other hand, has alternated between active involvement in
the EU’s foreign policy and a passive stance in the system. Originally, the country is active in the
European-institution building but it was not consistent. Italy’s actions in the EU is also
influenced by the lack of cooperation between Italy’s governing coalitions that prevent collective
action on the country’s actions in the Union.151
For the remaining members of the EU who joined after the formative period starting
1978, they had to agree with the Union’s current laws and obligations (or acquis communautaire)
and its processes which have been established before the inclusion of this member states. With
this factor in mind, these member countries cannot make a significant influence on the decisionmaking process of the EU’s institutions. In each accession, adjustment makes it difficult for these
member countries to catch up with each wave of accession. Adjustment is also made difficult by
the growing policy areas that the Union needs to consider for every expansion. Under the acquis
communautaire, member countries would have to read over 80,000 pages worth of legislation
that would continue growing as the expansion continue to grow.152
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Regarding size, the influence of each member country is dependent on their classification
under the Treaty of Nice, and they are divided into four groups: large, medium, small and very
small member countries. The Treaty reweighed the votes in the Council and the number of
Commissioners every member state can appoint, preventing the onset of further conflict between
large and small states regarding the right to vote. The large states – Germany, France, UK, Italy,
Spain and Poland – possesses a larger voting power but also they have political, economic and
diplomatic influence in the functions of the EU. Larger states can call upon larger extensive
administrative or technical resources when it comes to policy-making. Germany is considered
the most powerful member of the European Union. Medium-sized states follow the broader
cluster of EU member states and this group comprised the Netherlands, Romania, Belgium,
Portugal, Hungary, Czech Republic and Greece. Smaller states often have significant influence
in negotiations because their national interests are often merged easily with the greater purpose.
Completing the cluster of EU member states are very small member countries which include
Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. However, while size does make some impacts in a state’s
power in the EU, it has small bearing for national approaches to EU policies involving
economics, domestic interests, and reform efforts.153 The wealth of each member country is also
synonymous with their influence in the EU as those with large economies like Germany, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria comprise the EU’s
‘net contributors club’ which allows to control the increases in the EU’s budget and limit costs.
Poor member countries who are the beneficiaries of the EU’s financial transfers, on the other
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hand, often argue for larger budget allocation and financial instruments to keep up with their
fellow member countries.154
Regarding state structure, the influence of each member country also varies depending on
their political structure. The Union currently has three federal states (Germany, Belgium and
Austria) while the rest of the member countries have either unitary or quasi-unitary governments.
The unitary states have a central government or the Republic government which tackles major
issues while regional governments are provided the capacity to act on regional issues. At present,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Hungary, Latvia,
Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Sweden are
the Union’s unitary states. In the case of France, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the
UK’s Channel Islands are considered federacies as these countries possess sub-state governments
that has autonomy in comparison to the other territories or provinces of these countries. Spain,
Italy and the UK are considered de facto federations or devolved states because these states can
dissolve the power of autonomous governments and it is the central government dictating
legislation in the region. State structure influences the EU’s actions establishing its constitutional
development. Subsidiarity is also an integral element in the influence of state structure as the
principle states that action should be based on an action of a government that can achieve the
policy goals without sacrificing citizen interest. Germany is known for being an advocate of the
subsidiarity principle as the German government won the right in 1992 to send ministers to the
Council of Ministers when the issue requires their specialties.155
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Economic ideology also varies per country and while there are six founding countries in
the EU, their respective interests brings in different ideologies to the EU. For France and
Germany, they strive for capitalist policies while Britain supports deregulation and economic
liberalization based on the Anglo-Saxon paradigm. Finally, integration preferences influence a
member country’s influence in the EU as considering the majority on who supports a total
integration of other countries while others fight for a more limited power for new countries.
Domestic politics often influence how each member country support EU integration and citizens
of member countries contribute to the member country’s actions in the EU.156
Throughout the conflict in Egypt, each member country had influenced EU progress in
enforcing its policies in the country in several different ways as each member country utilized
their own agenda when it comes to the stability of Egypt and sustained their respective national
agenda. When the January Revolt had taken place, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British
Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy had defined EU action as
they released a joint statement on January 29 – exactly the time Omar Suleiman was appointed as
the vice president- without taking into consideration the discussions within the EU regarding its
official stance regarding the issue.157 According to the joint communique, France, Germany and
the UK expressed concern regarding the violence occurring in Egypt and called for President
Mubarak to show the same moderating capacity it has for many years regarding regional
stability. The three EU countries also called for political, economic and social reforms promised
by Mubarak and prevent the use of violence against demonstrators. The three states also
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supported the Egyptian people, citing that the public have legitimate grievances and it is the task
of President Mubarak to ensure fair and free elections to foster transformation.158
When the EU was discussing the actions in Egypt on February 4, five member countries
had circumvented the EU to issue a joint communique that called for an immediate transition in
Egypt. 159 Through the joint communique, France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Germany stressed
their concerns about the Egyptian situation and condemn the violence occurring in the country.
The statement iterated the calls for immediate transition to allow Egypt to overcome the
challenges it is currently facing.160 When the ENP review was called after Mubarak’s removal
from office, only six member countries – France, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Slovenia and Malta –
outlined actions the EU should consider in their relationship with the Mediterranean countries.
These six countries also called for greater emphasis on the South and recognized the importance
of differentiating its partners, introducing the “more for more” principle where the EU would
reward the partner country if they manage to comply with the EU’s request. The six countries
also suggested that the 2011-2013 financial package meant for Egyptian aid revised in lieu of the
Egyptian crisis. These member countries also stressed the need for the EU to emphasize on the
“project” dimensions of the UfM. It was clear this declaration for the UfM’s revival is brought
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forward by France who wished to get the UfM back on track after several constraints in its
enforcement.161
The EU’s stance in the region after Mubarak’s removal had been quite weak especially as
they took a while before they launched their actions in the region immediately after the Arab
Spring in Egypt took place. On February 2011, the EU have called for negotiations between
ministers to decide as to what the Union would do with the assets of Mubarak’s top officials and
how they can influence developments in the region. Cairo – under the SCAF- had requested the
EU to freeze the assets of Mubarak’s cronies and his family members. However, the European
nations were divided over how the action can be done as the UK wished for a total 27 pledge
from the EU member countries to freeze the assets of the Mubarak cronies while France pointed
out that the EU must aid in the economic revival efforts for the country first before pushing for
democracy. 162 The decision of the EU to freeze the assets of the Mubarak family and their
cronies took until March 21st due to the lack of consensus as to what extent should the assets be
frozen to that the entire EU can contribute to it.163 Under Decision 2011/172/CFSP restrictive
measures were imposed to key Mubarak officials and related bodies due to proven graft and
corruption charges. The decision was revised by the Council on November 26, 2012 through
Decision 2012/723/CFSP which would allow the current government to release certain parts of
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the frozen funds belonging to corrupt officials and use it for reconstruction and reparations to
affected citizens where these funds are taken from.164
Aside from their direct involvement in the actions of the EU, the individual member
countries also made it difficult for the EU to enact its policies due to the national interests of
each nation as seen in the actions of four of its major members France, Germany, Italy and the
United Kingdom. Their respective actions towards the new leaders of Egypt clashed consistently
with the image the EU tried to convey throughout the period and the lack of respect to the EU
had also instigated difficulties in terms of moderating the position of the EU in Egypt, especially
on introducing democracy and reform.
France
When it comes to the foreign policy of France, the country does not support political
conditionality unlike its fellow European countries. Since the 1992 Franco-African Summit,
France has been keen on pursuing security first for its international initiatives, followed by
development and democratization. French Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Daums
indicated that economic reform must be first because it would provide the foundations for
democratization. In 2006, the country introduced the “Governance Strategy for French
Development Assistance” which highlighted that a “turnkey” human rights and democratic
model would be null and void if it disrupts the capacity of the society to decide for themselves.
With this remark, the French government stated that cooperation “should not be measured so
much by its ability to lay down universal standards manipulated in the abstract through
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conditionality as it should be assessed by its ability to provide each partner with specific
experiences and expertise to enable them to develop their own policies.” France had reaffirmed
their position on conditionality’s ineffectiveness in 2007 as they indicated that recipient countries
of French Aid only needed to have a strong and sustainable macroeconomic program, a growth
and poverty reduction program matching the MDG standards and a good public financial
management system. In 2011, the government yet again reiterated its move away from
conditionality with the “Development Cooperation: A French Vision”. This long-term strategy
highlights that the country will now move “from a development assistance policy which implies
an asymmetrical donor-beneficiary relationship over to a policy of cooperation with developing
countries.” The government would also support the development of good governance, but the
country will not interfere with how the recipient country would be developing their protocols. 165
Similar to the rest of the Western European nations, France also has a significant number
of Muslim communities in its midst. However, many French citizens were scared of the growing
Muslim visibility in the 1980s. Since France had always adhered to secularism, French animosity
towards Muslims have always been strong and indicated the growing misunderstanding between
both groups. In recent years, the political position of France towards Islam has been growing
away from hostility because of the peaceful prayer session in the mosques throughout the
country and the misconceptions regarding home-grown Muslim extremism have been declining.
The government had opened several key institutions that would provide Muslims representation
in the country and protect the country from the growth of radical Islam. In recent years, the
Islamic movements in France had been divided to different schools of Islam and the universalist
schools formed by young Muslims. However, as the movements of these two groups of Islamist
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movements in the country, the French government is now trying means in ensuring that French
Muslims could easily integrate to the country while still retaining their values and still stick to
the modernity that France upholds in their country.166
France’s stance on political conditionality and political Islam can be seen roughly in its
response to the Arab Spring while maintaining its support to EU action. President Sarkozy
imposed an image that it is France that has the capacity to lead the EU leadership when it comes
to the onset of the Arab Spring in comparison to its European counterparts, pushing for a more
aggressive and active EU to respond to these threats. However, France failed to realize the
capacity of the protests to predetermine the status quo in the entire Mediterranean which disabled
their targets to be reached in the region. Despite this failure to the French approach to the Arab
Spring, France had taken different strategies per country to responding the impacts of the Arab
Spring in these countries as France takes into consideration their relationship with the country. In
Tunisia, for example, France had backed ousted President Ben Ali. On the other hand; the
country had taken a slightly discreet distance when the demonstrations in Algeria and Morocco
began and supported the respective governments for its efforts to sustain democracy. There was
also inconsistency in the prospect of human rights protections as seen in Bahrain because when
the regime had used violence to repel the opposition, France had suspended their exports and
indicated they would continue trade if the country respects human rights.
In a European level, the French government had continued to support EU action for
democracy and reform, but it did act unilaterally to push for the application of their initiatives to
aid recovery efforts. In Tunisia, for example, when the European Commission opened 258
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million euros to support the country, France had added 2 months later that they will contribute 1
billion euros for both Egypt and Tunisia, emphasizing that they believe in economic recovery as
a means to then restore democracy with it. The unilateral moves done by France under Sarkozy
also reflected how the country blends with EU multilateralism, especially when it came to the
issue of immigration. France has been very opposed to hosting a huge number of Muslim
communities in its midst due to the traditional stigmas brought by Islamism in the country in
previous years. Critics did point out that Sarkozy’s unilateralism had only disabled an effective
EU action in the Mediterranean and their continuous movement only showed that it is not one
with the southern territories and violated EU norms.167
With the election of President Francois Hollande, he revised the French approach for the
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in October 2012. France would still be supporting financial aid
in the region to improve infrastructure in the Maghreb region. Hollande also highlighted the
improvement of the UfM and boost it with the ENP, incorporating the UfM as one of the
program’s implementation agencies. Hollande also opened the “5+5 Dialog” which would
compensate for the failure of the UfM so EU and MENA countries could reach out better. France
had also supported economic and logistical growth for Algeria, which is a critical ally to the
country in the Middle East. France and Algeria had signed several financial agreements to boost
economic and financial cooperation between France and Algeria. 168
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When it came to the issue of Egyptian Uprising, the French had shown two opposing
sides as they were previous allies with the ousted President Hosni Mubarak. In a statement after
the protests, President Nicolas Sarkozy admitted that he underestimated the significance of these
protests and highlighted the necessity to revising EU policies in the region. He also admitted that
the country had only understood the gravity of the situation in Egypt and in the rest of the region
when Mubarak had been forced out of their position in the UfM. They were also unable to
establish strong solidarity in the demonstrations because of their previous engagements with the
ousted president. 169 When it became clear that Egypt’s Mubarak will indeed fall, France’s
political Islam stance immediately caused them to challenge EU integration towards these
nations alongside Italy. In a joint statement, both Sarkozy and Italy Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi demanded that the EU launches deportation pacts and return escapees back to their
home countries. Both countries called for reform, especially for border-free regimes they wish to
push with the Euro-Mediterranean partners.170 Under Hollande’s leadership, France maintained
in better ties with Egypt as they have recently signed an economic deal with the country
amounting to $6 billion in military hardware. Egypt has recently requested France to shut down
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Muslim Brotherhood’s satellite channel El-Sharq because it is affecting Egypt’s efforts in
restoring democracy in the country.171
Germany
Germany’s foreign policy also supports political conditionality, especially when it comes
to their aid efforts. Germany became one of the earliest key donors in Western Europe after the
Second World War. Originally, the country’s political conditionality effort involved the
combination of diplomatic relations and foreign aid, while also pushing for the non-recognition
of the German Democratic Republic. However, this attempt was not successful considering the
fact the GDR was recognized by the United Nations. In their next attempt in the 1980s,
development aid provided by the Federal Republic of Germany entailed the adherence of
recipient countries to human rights and democracy protection. The federal government expressed
that the country will fight for the establishment of democratic structures because this will
improve the protections that would be able to be given to the oppressed population. Two years
later in 1984, the Bundestag had yet again readopted this goal in their newest protocols and
highlighted that recipient countries must reach a higher level in the protection of civil and
political rights. Further political reforms to Germany’s aid programs in 1989 and the 1990s to
ensure that development programs would be better for the betterment of cooperation between
parties. The country had introduced a five criteria system for Germany’s development efforts and
they are the following:
1. Respect for human rights and liberties
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2. Active civil society participation in political reform and activities
3. Respect to the rule of law
4. Application of market-friendly approaches for economic development
5. Active commitment of the recipient country to development.172
Similar to France, Germany also has a growing distrust with regards to the Muslim
population in the country, especially with the growing Islamisation in some of its Muslim
groups. In an assessment done by Gatestone Institute, a majority of the German Muslim
population believed in the strict adherence of its people to the Sharia law before taking into
consideration the constitutions of their host countries. Although Germany has enacted policies
that would protect the Muslim population in the country, several groups and critics indicated that
these agreements with the German government do not bolster discussions that would improve
Muslim integration in the country. It only fosters the development of a parallel Muslim society
that separate these Muslims from the rest of the German people. Due to the growing crackdown
in France, Germany has expressed concern over the possibility that the violence in the country
may grow especially with the German Islamists already in the country. Germany is trying to
crack down German Islamists in the country which is calling for violence towards the German
people. Several Islamist groups have already been banned in the country in light of the growing
Islamic propaganda transmitted in Dusseldorf, Gladbeck, Solingen and Frankfurt. The German
people, in light of the numerous arrests and propaganda growing in the country, all expressed
that they consider Islam as a threat to their security even if the government firmly claims that
these people are welcome in Germany. Currently, continuous debates and arguments regarding
Islamism continue to divide the country and its Muslim population due to the incapacity of the
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German government to reach a compromise with the Muslim groups, especially in the
application of certain aspects of the Sharia law to German policies.173
Germany is undeniably one of the EU’s most powerful countries and its influence in the
EU’s policy in the Arab Spring. Germany always saw the region as a region of limited strategic
importance except for countries like Israel and Iran. It was content in allowing other nations to
take part in the affairs of the region while establishing partnership with the country silently. If
they had to intervene, Germany would only do it to stop French influence in growing in the
region. With the establishment of the European Neighborhood Policy and its application in the
region, Germany wished to establish reform in the UfM in order to reach out to influential parties
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and establish continuous business partnerships in the region.
However, when the Tunisian regime of Ben Ali had slowly fallen apart, it was clear to Germany
that EU policy will no longer work in the region and called for reform, as well as criticized
southern EU nations for not taking action in the region. While most of its actions and decisions
tend to clash with the French government, it was clear that Germany was now looking at the
region in a new light and reassess their regional position in the Middle Eastern issue now that its
national interests are now at risks from the unstable conflict.174
In the case of Egypt, the German government has signed the “Berlin Declaration” with
Egypt and several other agreements with the country on August 12, 2011. Under the agreement
of Egypt and Germany, Germany would support the calls for bilateral cooperation and enable
Egypt to pay off its 240-million-euro debt for the ODA within the span of four years which
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Egypt will reciprocate with the introduction of reform, especially in democracy. It also opens
channels for discussions between the two nations to discuss critical issues affecting the region
and the globe. Egypt greatly benefitted with their partnership with Germany as the funds
provided by Germany to boost its civil society sector. Germany was also very open for active
engagement by introducing new foreign aid commitments in exchange for better development
cooperation and engagement by the recipient countries.175
When Al-Sisi was voted into office, German Chancellor Angela Merkel refused to meet
with Al-Sisi because she wanted to see Al-Sisi’s initiative to start the parliamentary elections
before meeting with the new president. Al-Sisi had postponed the elections and it was clear
Merkel did not stick with her foreign policy initiative as Al-Sisi arrived in Berlin on June 3,
2015. Experts indicated that this visit had several national interests taken into consideration as it
would boost business initiatives of German companies in Egypt. German companies would see
Al-Sisi’s visit as a go signal for starting investments in the country. Merkel had also stressed
through her spokesman Stephen Seibert that she will meet the Egyptian president because “Egypt
is an immensely important player in the Arab World” and would contribute greatly to the peace
and stability of the region.176 In their joint press conference, Merkel had expressed that they will
aid Egypt in economic development and aid the country in its fight against extremism. Merkel
had also stressed in her statement that: “Egypt is one of the central countries in a region marked
by unrest and instability” and helping the country’s business sector would reduce instability
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greatly. Merkel did criticize the Al-Sisi regime in his visit in terms of its human rights policies,
especially on the issue of the death penalty.177
Italy
Like other European countries, Italy has a significant number of Muslim population in the
country reaching up to 1 million Muslims. Most of of these Muslim population come from
Albania, Morocco, Tunisia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan and Bangladesh. With the 9/11 attacks
and the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, Italy has enacted the law “Package Pisanu” which
would empower the government to provide “urgent measures against international terrorism” in
2005. The package consists of 19 articles involving security, anti-terrorism and immigration
policies; highlighting the suitable response of the country towards security threats.178 Using the
Package Pisanu law, the Italian police managed to investigate several imams in 2007 after tips of
these imams teaching Islamic extremism. The most notable example of the 2007 probes was the
case of Mohamed Kohaila who had been reported to commit anti-Western behavior and violence
after official investigations. In 2008, Italy’s “best known anti-terrorism magistrate” Stefano
Dambruoso stated that Islamic extremism has already spread in Italy prior to the 9/11 attacks.179
When the Arab spring occurred in 2010, Italy had expressed concerns regarding the
regime stability of the South rather than the promotion of civil rights and equality especially in
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Algeria and Libya. The Italian government expressed concerns of the potential impacts of the
political liberalization that would be produced once terrorism and immigration enter Italy from
partner countries. In response to the changing situation in the Arab region, Italy concentrated on
“immigration” coming from southern Mediterranean regions. Italy opened humanitarian permits
to incoming migrants in order to enter the country freely. The country also took part in a joint
proposal with France to revise the Schengen system to monitor free movement of people within
the region. When the Arab Spring occurred in Egypt, the Italy had declared a state of emergency
to ensure full monitoring of the migrant flows from the region.180
After the removal of Mubarak, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi invited SCAF chief
Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi to Rome on June 2 to take part in the celebrations
for Italy’s establishment as a republic. The visit would also rekindle negotiations between Cairo
and Rome regarding trade partnerships and more Italian investments in Egypt. 181 Under the
Morsi regime, Italy agreed to invest 800 million euros in Egypt when the Egyptian president
visited Rome on September 2012. Morsi met with President Giorgio Napolitano and both leaders
declared that they will work in partnership to boost bilateral relations and economic cooperation
between the two countries. Prior to Morsi’s visit, Egypt signed an agreement with Italy in May
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2012 for the debt swap worth $100 million for Italian investments. 182 When El-Sisi assumed
office in 2014, he flew to Italy to meet with both the Italian Prime Minister and President to
discuss military coordination to combat Islamist militias in Libya and the improvement of EgyptItalian economic ties. With regards to his meeting with Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, Sisi is
expected to broach the topic on investments and poverty reduction programs.183
United Kingdom
The British government has often endorsed the adherence of the country to political
conditionality to its foreign aid programs since the end of the Cold War. In order to make sure
that political conditionality is applied in its foreign policy, the Labor government in 1997 had
established the Department of International Development or the DfID) which would request
recipient governments of British aid to “pursue policies which promote responsive and
accountable government, recognizing that governments have obligations to all their people [and]
promote the enjoyment of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights”. In 2005, the
DfID had worked alongside the British Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO) in indicating the country’s aid commitments and revised them to match the current
situation in the international community. Under the document “Partnership for poverty reduction:
rethinking conditionality”, the new aid commitment of the UK will have three objectives:
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1. Reduction of poverty and the fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals
2. Respecting human rights and international laws
3. Empowering financial management and accountability of recipient countries.
If recipient countries would fail to achieve these objectives despite British aid, the
country has the power to rescind aid especially if evidences of the recipient country’s violations
are forwarded to the British government. This conditionality policy has continuously been seen
in various aid programs of the country around the country and in 2011, the DfID further boosted
this policy under the “Technical Note on Implementing DfID’s strengthened approach to budget
support.” The UK also expressed that they will be reviewing governments applying for British
aid and push for domestic accountability before their aid would be given. Aside from political
conditionality towards economic aid, the British government also applied shared commitments
for human rights in developing countries.184
When it comes to political Islam or Islamism, Britain currently has a sizable Muslim
population which mostly are immigrants that entered the country since the 1950s either as
refugees, immigrants or asylum-seekers. With the onset of the 9/11 attacks, Britain had been on
alert for the possibility that these Muslims may conduct attacks on terrorism in the country. In
2003 and 2004, the British fears were justified when discoveries of weapons that can be used for
attacks throughout London. In 2004, authorities arrested Muslim cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri for
encouraging murder on Jews and non-Muslims to impose the sharia law. The 2005 London
transportation bombings also caused the British government to reassess their position on
Islamism in the country. The British government condemned extremists currently causing
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terrorism to flourish in the country and even British Muslims expressed opposition towards
political Islam. In order to counter Islamism’s growth, the British government – like other
Western European countries – applied a three-pronged approach:
1. Application of general counterterrorism policies that do not pertain to a
specific sect of Islam
2. Use policies that would repress Islamism
3. Use of policies that would ensure that Muslims can integrate to their
respective countries.
Britain had also reformed its anti-terrorism strategies to match the international standards
against Muslim extremism. The country introduced the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy that
sustains the following strands:
1. PREVENT – integrate Muslims to the British society and challenge extremist
tendencies of these Muslims.
2. PURSUE – repress violence by monitoring Muslim terrorist movements through
intelligence gathering and law enforcement operations.
3. PROTECT and PREPARE – reduce vulnerability of potential targets and ensure
effective response towards any attacks.185
When the Arab Spring had occurred in the Middle East in 2010, Britain’s response had
been supportive to the EU effort as the Arab Spring would now usher a more active democratic
growth in the region. According to UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, Britain’s actions
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regarding the onset of the Arab Spring comprises three principles.186 The first major principle is
the fact Britain would not dictate the change outside the country and they would not get involved
in the issue directly. The British government recognizes that the conflict in the region is not
Britain’s revolutions and the country cannot decide as to what future these Arab countries should
have. However, Britain would help in ensuring diplomatic pressures would be applied in
transition governments to support change. The second principle entails the importance of human
rights and freedoms and the British government believes these rights would be followed
accordingly by transition governments. It is the belief of the British government that these
transition countries would begin the process on democracy because it is expected of them by the
international community. Finally, the British government’s actions regarding the Arab Spring is
also quite passive to the point that they would only become involved with funding and necessary
international pressures that would assist in the development efforts. The British government had
also expressed that the country would be working alongside other organizations such as the Gulf
Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the EU in pushing for political transition and
economic recovery for the Middle East, especially the Middle East peace process.187
Taking into consideration the position of the British government regarding Islamism,
political conditionality and the Arab Spring, its actions in the Egyptian Uprising had indicated
their national interests in securing the country as a political ally while expressing their support to
the EU in some of its policies. The country sees Egypt as a key partner for the success of the
Middle East Peace Process alongside Sudan and Iran. Egypt is also seen as a buffer against
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extremist in the region and a key commercial partner of Britain. With the onset of the Arab
Spring, Britain had immediately increased dialogue between key Egyptians leaders and
protesters, calling for democratic elections. 188 Prime Minister Cameron himself had flown to
Egypt immediately after Mubarak was removed from office and portrayed the country as a
“candid friend” of the Egyptian government. He called for the Egyptian interim government to
adhere to the existing commitments of the country with the international community and begin
free and fair elections. Cameron also indicated that the British government would not just focus
on economic trade, but also to push for political reforms, security improvements and improved
commercial channels for British businesses.189 By the time Morsi stepped into office, the British
government sent their invitation to have the Egyptian leader visit the country so they can discuss
effective partnership and democracy promotion in the new regime. The British government also
promised that Egyptians hoping to escape would be returned to Egypt, including the members of
Mubarak’s regime as a condition to get Morsi to acquiesce to British requests.190
With the recent election of President Al-Sisi to the Egyptian government, it was clear to
critics that Britain’s national interests would be affected especially in terms of Britain’s
adherence to the promotion of human rights if they reach out to the Al-Sisi regime. With the EU
still in somehow shaky terms in the region and human rights still a critical concern in improving
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democracy in the region, the British government had accepted the Egyptian president’s visit to
London despite the criticisms of such action. Cameron had invited Al-Sisi in order to discuss
with him the review regarding the Muslim Brotherhood which would coincide with the country’s
aims to improve their action against extremism. Al-Sisi’s visit was a way for him to express that
Britain is ready for any form of attacks from extremist factions in the country. Britain’s
continuous relationship with Egypt through Al-Sisi’s visit further boosts the country’s
cooperation with Egypt and ensure that they can protect each other from any threat and ensure
that their national interests are still protected. 191

Impacts of the EU’s Structure and Decision-Making System to EU’s Policies
Finally, EU action could not really work in the Egyptian Uprising because of EU’s
complex structure and decision-making system which disabled the country to establish better
coordination with its member countries and handle the changing political environment of Egypt.
Aside from the composition of its member countries, the EU is made unique because of the
institutions that influence its decision-making capacity and influence in the region. The most
powerful institution in the EU is the European Commission, which represents the the EU in the
international community and also ensures that each member country adheres to EU treaties and
legislation. The Commission also has the power to propose policy, lead in trade talks, establish
competition policy and ensure member country compliance. Most of the powers of the
Commission come from the Treaties that support the EU’s structure and standards.
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The Council of Ministers follows the Commission in terms of its influence in the EU’s
structure and it is considered the primary decision-making body of the Union alongside the
European Parliament. The Council has a very complex system as to how it acts as a legislative
body. Meetings done by Council members often entail different configurations depending on the
issue in question. If the Council will be meeting for environmental protection, the ministers that
should meet in the council are the environmental ministers. Ten additional Councils are also
within the Council to ensure all critical subjects that the EU needs to take into consideration such
as foreign policy, general affairs and budgets are taken into consideration by a specific sector.
When it comes to voting, the Council of Ministers used to follow a majority voting system to
decide on legislation. However, this had to change after the 2004-2007 enlargements since new
governments had to be added with the system. The Council also follows a “Community method”
to decide on sensitive issues such as foreign policy. Currently, the rules of voting require a triple
majority before legislation can be brought into discussion from the Council of Ministers. 192
Working groups are often established by the Council to scrutinize texts and proposals and then
they determine if the proposal holds merits for the EU in general. Once a consensus is met, it is
forwarded to the Coreper, which would then tackle the proposals and decisions before they are
passed to the European Council. If the proposal is politically-sensitive, member countries are
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provided the chance to establish negotiations with other parties to reach a compromise to settle
the legislation for the European Council.193
The next agency within the EU that sustains its power is the European Council, which
comprises the members of the Heads of Government and highlight negotiations between each
member to discuss critical policies and issues. Members meet four times per year to discuss
issues like enlargement, climate change and treaty reforms which had been brought forward in
each meeting. The Council also tackles issues that cannot be resolved within the Council of
Ministers. The Lisbon Treaty further boosts the role of the European Council to nominate the
President of the European Council, which would be the counterpart of the President of the
European Commission. The President of the European Council tends to serve as the mediator
and facilitator of European Council Meetings and assist in the enlargement efforts of accession
countries to the EU. 194
Similar to the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament also takes into consideration
the legislative functions of the EU. Many consider the Parliament as the voice of decisionmaking in the EU. Unlike other Parliaments in a national level, the European Parliament cannot
initiate legislator and it can only discuss aspects like spending when it comes to the budget of the
EU. However, it does forcefully exercise its legislative powers and decides on all EU legislation
before it can be passed to law. The Parliament also determines if the EU would accept a
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particular policy and agreement. 195 Specialized parliamentary committees are established to
ensure that legislation is properly analyzed and trigger political negotiations between member
countries to establish compromises. Ministers are given the time to propose amendments to the
proposals directed in the parliament before the legislation is sent to the full Parliament for review
and voting. Political parties often get involved with the negotiation process and as a result, the
Parliament tend to create a composite amendment to ensure that each party will support the
legislation. Once it is approved by all parties, policies can be put into force after a year.196
Finally, the EU also has its very own Court of Justice and unlike its other fellow EU
institutions, it does not have a very strong power in the EU. The ECJ ensures that the Treaties of
the EU are properly interpreted and applied. It is also the final arbiter should there be legal
disputes between institutions or member countries. The Court also monitors the adherence of the
EU member countries and institutions to their responsibilities. The ECJ can also fine member
countries should they violate EU law at anyway. The ECJ also helps member countries to
determine how EU law can be applied in the rulings of national laws, especially if it has
European leanings. If the Court has a pro-integration agenda, it boosts the capacity of national
courts to be included in the EU’s legal system and assist in the resolution of conflicts.
Oftentimes, critics of the ECJ state that it is a policy-making body rather than a judiciary body
considering the influence they play to the interpretation of law for the national level. 197
With the various functions and systems within the EU, it was difficult for the EU to
establish a strong response to the Egyptian Uprising. It was not clear for members of the EU as
195
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to how they can utilize the Union’s influence in the Egyptian region given the different positions
of EU institutions on how EU action should be established. Since the EU could not coordinate its
member countries, it took them a while before they can make a clear action in the Egyptian crisis
as seen in the freezing of assets of Mubarak’s people. The heads of critical EU agencies such as
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy also had been assertive when it comes to
stressing that Mubarak must show his sincerity while High Representative Catherine Ashton had
expressed a simple statement that the government recognizes the human rights of protesters. The
Council, Commission and the Parliament were also divided over the stance the EU must take.
The Parliament wanted an assertive EU to take action in the Egyptian Uprising, releasing a
resolution on February 17 stating that it will concentrate on Egypt’s democratic transition and
then review the ENP. The Council took almost a month before the assets of Mubarak’s people
were frozen in Europe on March. The High Commissioner was also unable to boost EU action
without the support of the members of the Council and approval of the Parliament and
Commission. 198
The Parliament continued to press on other EU institutions to resolve the succeeding
conflicts in Egypt. When President Morsi gave himself expanded constitutional powers through
several constitutional decrees, the head of the European Parliament Martin Schulz stated that the
EU should put economic pressure on Egypt to stop the Morsi regime. In his statement, Schultz
stated that “The European Union must make it clear that there can no political nor economic
cooperation without pluralist democracy in Egypt.” He stressed that only economic pressure can
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influence Morsi to stop his continuous rise to power.199 In September 2013, the Parliament also
released its resolution on the July 2013 coup. In their resolution, the Parliament stated that it is
one with the Egyptian people in calling for justice for those who have been killed in the violent
clashes throughout the country. The Parliament criticized the Muslim Brotherhood for failing to
stop their supporters when it comes to their response to the protesters and condemned all forms
of violence and terrorism spreading in the country. The Parliament also calls for a immediate
political transition to ensure the transfer of power from the military to civilian authorities and
call the active participation of the people. The Parliament had also urged the Union to consider
the principles of conditionality and the economic challenges that may prevent Egypt from
achieving the standards set by both parties in terms of its aid program. The resolution also
reiterated the establishment of an EU mechanism that would provide legal and technical
assistance to all Arab Spring countries under its May 23, 2013 declaration which had been
postponed due to the Egyptian coup.200
The EEAS was also ineffective in pushing for immediate action and implementation of
European foreign policy in the region. Upon its establishment, the EEAS was considered to be an
autonomous from the Commission’s control. It was also meant to be the first response team of
the EU in times of crisis such as the Arab Spring in Egypt and serve as emissaries for the EU.
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However, since the EEAS did not have a clear political vision or initiative in applying the EU’s
foreign policy goals overseas, the EEAS was unable to achieve its doctrine and caused problems
for the EU by the time the Arab Spring had occurred. Further adding to the problem of the EEAS
is the conflicts within the EU agencies with regards to the benefits to the EU’s foreign policy.
Some EU agencies argued that the EEAS should be disbanded as its tasks is similar to another
DG’s functions, while others argue that the EEAS does not have the mechanisms and policies
needed that would legitimize its benefits as an agency for the enforcement of the EU’s foreign
policy. 201
Concluding Remarks
It is clear that the EU’s action in the Egyptian crisis has been heavily curtailed by three
factors which stopped any of its policies from taking into fruition since 2011 to the present time.
Aside from the changing political environment in Egypt, muddling the EU’s actions in the region
is the different national interests of each one of the Union’s member countries that posed
complications for a strong EU foreign policy. As these member countries, especially the three
major actors in the EU, have their own perspectives on the benefits of Egypt and the Middle
East, they applied a variety of policy instruments to ensure that while they support the EU, they
can still achieve their policy interests. Finally, the effectiveness of EU’s foreign policy is greatly
affected by the EU’s complex structure and decision-making system because each division
within the EU has a different sentiment as to how the issue in Egypt can be resolved. While the
EU does have good intentions in reaching out to the Egyptian government and its citizens, it is
clear that it cannot fully deliver its initiatives and promises to the people.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this study aimed to investigate if the EU can promote change in regions
affected by the Arab Spring and introduce democracy without US involvement or interference.
This study also aimed to discover if the EU can introduce a more efficient reform program and
deliver its promises to the people.
Similar to the sudden onset of the uprising, the study indicated that the EU has been taken
off guard with regards to the onset of the Arab Spring in 2010 and was unable to instigate reform
immediately due to the sheer extent of the entire revolution. In an interview with the EEAS
Representative Patrice Bergamini, Head of the Middle East, North Africa Division in the EEAS,
Bergamini stated that the EU’s action towards the Arab Spring should not be criticized so deeply
because the event itself was difficult to predict and immediately responding to it is difficult due
to the different countries of the EU. He also stated that “the crisis in both Syria and the Sahel, for
example, still have unknown variables on how it could affect the entire region’s stability and
EU’s actions’ effectiveness. The Arab Spring entire impact cannot be determined for another 15
to 20 years.” Bergamini also expressed that better successes could be reached if the EEAS and
the European Commission can be improved in terms of their cooperation with one another in
highlighting key issues in the Mediterranean such as education, human rights and
development.202
With the onset of the Egyptian Arab Spring, the EU still pushed for democratic
promotion in the country while providing economic aid to ensure that the Egyptian people can
finally recover from the revolution. The EU has also been able to introduce new initiatives when
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it comes to the security framework in the region now that terrorism and migration has become a
concern for many nations. They were also considered key factors to the improvement of civil
society groups and in promoting negotiations as to how such groups could become more active
members of the transition process.
However, while the EU does have strong objectives when it comes to its policies for the
region, including the promoting of exercising democracy and recovery, it was clear that EU
policies were greatly influenced by its individual member states, Egypt’s current political status,
and its structure which affected its effectiveness. The changing political leadership in Egypt and
their respective interests greatly clashed with the EU, disabling the Union from creating lasting
partnerships with its leaders. The member countries have also taken several steps outside the EU
which derailed its influence and the development of strong EU policies towards the region. The
Member countries also indicated which image the EU should convey to the crisis, further
complicating policy initiatives. Some member countries even had a passive stance as to how the
EU should act upon the issue, further affecting the EU’s capacity in introducing reform in the
unstable country. In the interview with Rania Aurag, Head of Euro- Arab Cooperation division in
the League of Arab States, she stated that ‘the League would be supportive over the efforts for
Arab solidarity but it would not become involved unless a state asks them to intervene.’ 203
Finally, the complex structure of the EU had hindered the advancement of policies in Egypt
because of the differing opinions to EU’s overall action in the region and the lack of unanimity.
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Limitations of the Study
The study has experienced several limitations that affected the quality and depth of the
discussions presented in the study. First, there has been a limitation with regards to the primary
sources which were coming from the Egyptian government whom were at the time, the SCAF
transition to President Al-Sisi’s government, as they are written in Arabic or only accessible
through offline means. In this regard, it disabled the researcher to highlight the Egyptian aspect
of the EU action. The second limitation to this study was with the lack of availability of sources
that would indicate the responses from other member countries –aside from the three major
players of the EU – with regards to the Arab and the Egyptian uprising. Finally, it was also a
challenge for the study to keep up with the conflicting sentiments of experts regarding the total
impact of the Arab Spring in Egypt; since Egypt remains in a somewhat delicate situation with
the recent election of President Al-Sisi, it can be said that the total impact of the Arab Spring
cannot be determined completely at the present time so long as the country remains unstable
democratically.
Future Research Direction
This study highlighted five major recommendations for future researchers to consider,
and who wish to continue or further dig deeper into this topic.
1. Identify other positions of member states regarding where they stand on the Arab Spring
in Egypt.
2. Compare Egypt’s situation and EU’s action with other nations affected by the Arab
Spring such as Tunisia, Syria and Libya.
3. Study EU-Egyptian Relations under former President Hosni Mubarak.
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4. Compare EU action in the Egyptian Spring with that of the US or the UN’s actions
regarding the same issue.
5. Determine the recommendations of which the EU could implement in order to improve
its overall foreign policy.
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